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98 N.C. REV. 1395 (2020)

The Debilitating Scope of Care Coordination Under HIPAA *
Care coordination aims to achieve personalized, high-quality, safe, and efficient
patient care through the deliberate organization of patient care activities and
sharing of information among all entities providing care. Care coordination
utilizes a broad spectrum of tools, combining traditional healthcare clinical
services and social welfare service approaches. Implementing care coordination
strategies has been shown to improve long-term health outcomes of patients with
a variety of health issues, including chronic diseases and conditions, acute health
problems, and rehabilitation or long-term care.
However, HIPAA's regulatory framework—which involves the minimum
necessary principle, security and technical requirements, limitations based on the
services provided, and lack of guidance in regards to care coordination—severely
limits the ability of entities to share medical information with social welfare
services. As such, healthcare entities are essentially crippled in delivering proper
care coordination and high-quality medical care.
This is especially stark for people suffering from chronic diseases and the
medically indigent, who rely on social welfare services and nonmedical entities
in underserved communities. This Comment argues that unless HIPAA
regulations are redefined by adding an express provision to allow use and
disclosure of electronic protected health information (PHI) for care
coordination purposes or expansion of the minimum necessary principle, care
coordination cannot help the patients who need it most.
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INTRODUCTION
While the Health Information Portability and Accountability Act
(“HIPAA”) 1 protects the privacy of an individual’s health information, it also
prevents providers from providing comprehensive medical care.
Comprehensive medical care takes all aspects of a person—physical,
psychological, social, and spiritual—into consideration in the management of a
patient’s well-being. 2 As such, providers must consider information regarding a
patient’s medical history, family history, and socioeconomic situation
throughout all phases of treatment. On one hand, HIPAA’s stringent
regulations on healthcare providers and payers ensures that health information
is exchanged securely and only as necessary to treat an immediate problem.
However, at the same time, these regulations deter providers from sharing
additional patient information that might be useful for treating a patient in a
more holistic and comprehensive manner. HIPAA’s regulatory framework
allows—and even encourages—healthcare providers to remain hesitant in
disclosing information because HIPAA merely permits, but does not require,

1. Health Information Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C. (2018)).
2. This term is also known as holistic medicine or alternative medicine; however, I chose not to
use these terms since they typically connote a practice that aims to heal, but lacks plausibility and is
generally untested, untestable, or proven ineffective. See generally ROSE SHAPIRO, SUCKERS: HOW
ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE MAKES FOOLS OF US ALL (2008) (chronicling the “epidemic” of
alternative medicine); Wallace Sampson, Antiscience Trends in the Rise of the “Alternative Medicine”
Movement, 775 N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 188 (1995) (describing “alternative” as a noneffective alternative to
medical treatment); Gina Kolata, On Fringes of Health Care, Untested Therapies Thrive, N.Y. TIMES (June
17, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/17/us/on-fringes-of-health-care-untested-therapiesthrive.html [https://perma.cc/7NLQ-DGWN] (detailing the business of alternative medicine, despite
doubts regarding efficacy and lack of regulation). Instead, I address the necessity for medicine to treat
not just the immediate physical health problem but also the broader well-being of the patient.
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them to share such information for much of their medical treatment activities. 3
In certain situations, such as sharing patient information to nonregulated
entities, covered providers are altogether banned from sharing patient
information absent express authorization, 4 which can delay medical care.
In the context of care coordination, which involves a broad spectrum of
tools that combine traditional healthcare clinical services with social welfare
service approaches, 5 HIPAA’s regulatory framework hampers adequate and
effective medical care. Care coordination requires substantial organization
between various entities such as primary care providers, physical therapists,
long-term nursing staff, and welfare services in order to achieve high-quality,
safe, and effective patient care. 6 Above all, care coordination depends on
reliable communication between entities with minimal filtering, so that each
entity may assess a patient’s complete situation as they provide treatment.
For people who suffer from chronic diseases 7 but have minimal resources
and no health insurance, this poses an especially troublesome situation. Many
of the social welfare services that third-party organizations provide are not
subject to HIPAA, so they do not have the capability to send or receive patient
information securely. In these situations, HIPAA serves as a serious obstacle
for care coordination.
More than 60% of adults in the United States suffer from at least one
chronic disease, with more than 40% having two or more chronic diseases. 8
Health-care costs associated with chronic conditions account for approximately
90% of total health-care spending, including both private insurance and
Medicare spending, 9 which amounts to $3.15 trillion in health-care spending

3. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(1) (2019).
4. See id. § 164.502(a).
5. See Care Coordination, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, https://www.ahrq.gov
/ncepcr/care/coordination.html [https://perma.cc/RV95-V6DV] (last updated Aug. 2018). The Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality is a federal agency that functions as a research arm of the
Department of Health and Human Services. For a more precise definition of care coordination, see
infra Section I.B.
6. See Care Coordination, supra note 5.
7. Examples of chronic diseases include heart disease, cancer, chronic lung disease, stroke,
Alzheimer’s disease, diabetes, and chronic kidney disease. See Nat’l Ctr. for Chronic Disease Prevention
& Health Promotion, Chronic Diseases in America, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/chronicdisease/resources/infographic/chronic-diseases.htm
[perma.cc/8CXKKASK].
8. Id.
9. CHRISTINE BUTTORFF, TEAGUE RUDER & MELISSA BAUMAN, MULTIPLE CHRONIC
CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (2017), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs
/tools/TL200/TL221/RAND_TL221.pdf [https://perma.cc/MQ69-2Y8Z]. Total healthcare spending
is the amount spent on all outpatient and inpatient healthcare services—prescriptions, ER visits,
inpatient stays, and outpatient visits—across all payers and includes out-of-pocket payments. Id. at 10.
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per year. 10 On average, individuals with chronic conditions spend nearly $8,000
annually in total health-care expenditures—six times as much as individuals
without chronic conditions. 11 In terms of out-of-pocket spending, individuals
with chronic diseases spend almost twice as much as those without—
approximately $1,100 each year. 12
These statistics suggest that insurance payers bear much of the costs
associated with chronic diseases. However, individuals still pay a significant
portion of their healthcare costs out-of-pocket. The financial impact associated
with having a chronic disease is high, and it is even higher for uninsured patients
with minimal resources. Proper care coordination involves a multitude of
entities, many of whom require some form of payment. Individuals who are
unable to access paid services may need to rely on low cost or free communitybased efforts—many of which are privately sponsored, fall outside traditionally
subsidized insurance programs, and are not required to follow HIPAA
regulations. 13 Services outside of traditional healthcare treatment, such as mealdelivery services, support groups, or temporary housing, require charity or
private funding. As such, primary care providers are reluctant to share patient

10. See Nat’l Ctr. for Chronic Disease Prevention & Health Promotion, Health and Economic Costs
of
Chronic
Diseases,
CTRS.
FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/chronicdisease/about/costs/index.htm#ref1
[https://perma.cc/DW9R-Y55J]
(“90% of the nation’s $3.5 trillion in annual healthcare expenditures are for people with chronic and
mental health conditions.”).
11. See BUTTORFF ET AL., supra note 9, at 10. Statistics are based on approximate spending per
group (any chronic condition versus no condition) compiled by the Rand Corporation in 2014. The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) cites this data in its broad assertions in supra
note 10. These figures were calculated by the author using data from Rand and the CDC.
12. See PATRICK RICHARD, REGINE WALKER & PIERRE ALEXANDRE, THE BURDEN OF OUT
OF POCKET COSTS AND MEDICAL DEBT FACED BY HOUSEHOLDS WITH CHRONIC HEALTH
CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 5–7 (2018), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file
?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0199598&type=printable [https://perma.cc/2GCD-5E9C]. For a breakdown
of the cost of each chronic disease, both in terms of direct healthcare costs and indirect costs (such as
lost income and reduced economic productivity), see generally HUGH WATERS & MARLON GRAF,
THE COST OF CHRONIC DISEASES IN THE U.S. (2018), https://assets1b.milkeninstitute.org/assets
/Publication/Viewpoint/PDF/Chronic-Disease-Executive-Summary-r2.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS9AYCKP].
13. See Lynn A. Blewett, Jeanette Ziegenfuss & Michael E. Davern, Local Access to Care Programs
(LACPs): New Developments in the Access to Care for the Uninsured, 86 MILBANK Q. 459, 459 (2008)
(discussing the emergence of locally-based health-care-access programs in response to the growing
number of uninsured); Erin Fries Taylor, Peter Cunningham & Kelly McKenzie, Community
Approaches to Providing Care for the Uninsured, 25 HEALTH AFFS 173, 173 (2006),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaff.25.w173
[https://perma.cc/T3AZ-ZD2C]
(tracking community strategies in response to rising rates of uninsured individuals). A public
alternative is safety net providers who provide patient care regardless of a patient’s ability to pay. See
Practice Facilitation Handbook, Module 2. Working with Safety Net Practices, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE
RES. & QUALITY, https://www.ahrq.gov/ncepcr/tools/pf-handbook/mod2.html [https://perma.cc
/G7E4-X4Q7]. However, this approach is limited to providers that receive government funding and
does not encompass the full scope of actors that might be necessary for care coordination.
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information to these community-based programs for fear of violating HIPAA,
which creates a break in the care coordination network.
HIPAA clearly covers actors who perform certain health-care-related
functions, such as billing an insurance company for medical care or making a
patient referral to another healthcare specialist. 14 But HIPAA does not clearly
define the scope of care coordination, instead making a mere mention of it as
part of a definition for another term. 15
Accordingly, HIPAA needs to be clarified for care coordination purposes
through the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) rulemaking process. 16
Modifying HIPAA through rulemaking is the only effective method of
ensuring that healthcare entities understand the contours of permissible patient
health information sharing and utilization for care coordination. However,
agencies are relatively reluctant to create legally binding regulations given the
complicated, time-consuming nature of the APA rulemaking procedure.
Instead, they are more willing to provide administrative guidance—a
nonbinding clarification that provides an administrative agency’s interpretation
of law. But administrative guidance falls far short in defining care coordination
in the proper scope for effective healthcare delivery.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a background of
HIPAA and how care coordination currently fits into that regulatory scheme.
Care coordination requires a holistic approach between healthcare providers,
health plans, social workers, and other third parties to provide adequate and
effective personalized healthcare. I argue that, given the current HIPAA
regulatory structure, care coordination is limited in its scope and unable to reach
its full potential. Part II offers a brief overview of the APA rulemaking process
and explains why issuing administrative guidance is a much easier process.
Although administrative guidance is not legally binding, regulated entities
generally respect guidance as if it had the same precedent as an administrative
ruling. Part III analyzes the recent Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”) guidance
on care coordination and predicts how HIPAA-covered entities will interpret
the guidance. The recent OCR guidance clarifies specific instances of patient
data sharing between health plans for care coordination purposes but does not
clarify care coordination generally. In Part IV, I argue that guidance from OCR
is not capable of clarifying care coordination to the degree needed for effective
healthcare. Instead, the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”)
should relax HIPAA restrictions surrounding sharing health information for
care coordination purposes, which can only be accomplished by changing federal
regulation.
14. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2019). For a discussion of HIPAA regulations and entities subject
to HIPAA, see infra Section I.A.
15. See infra Section I.A.
16. See infra Section II.A.
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I. HIPAA AND CARE COORDINATION BACKGROUND
HIPAA regulates the use and transmission of a patient’s healthcare
information by healthcare providers, healthcare plans, healthcare
clearinghouses, and related business associates. 17 HIPAA regulations loosely
and vaguely define care coordination, which leads to a lack of continuity of care
between actors involved in care coordination. Without a clear, robust definition
of which care coordination related transactions are allowed under HIPAA,
actors remain hesitant to provide more than scant patient information to other
actors involved in care coordination. 18 This lack of certainty leads to worse
health outcomes for patients because service providers do not share the
necessary information to comprehensively treat patients. 19 This section explains
the mechanics of HIPAA and describes how care coordination currently fits
within the existing regulatory scheme.
A.

Brief Overview of HIPAA
1. What Is HIPAA?

Introduced in 1996, HIPAA was intended to facilitate continued insurance
coverage for individuals who move between employers that provide health
insurance by modernizing the flow of healthcare information. 20 Under HIPAA,
HHS established policies and procedures for maintaining privacy and security
of individual healthcare information, listed offenses related to healthcare, and
established civil and criminal penalties for those offenses. 21
As part of the policies and procedures, HHS enacted the HIPAA Privacy
and Security Rules, establishing security standards for safeguarding protected
health information (“PHI”) 22 held or transferred electronically through

17. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2019); see also Office for Civil Rights, Covered Entities and Business
Associates, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (June 16, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/covered-entities/index.html [https://perma.cc/5GPE-24A5] (listing types of entities
regulated by HIPAA).
18. See infra notes 155–69 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Section III.B.
20. See Health Information Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.) (introducing
the Act’s purpose “to improve portability and continuity of health insurance coverage”).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7c(a) (2018). The statute directs the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services to control fraud and abuse with respect to delivery and payment of
healthcare through the creation of regulations and enforcement programs. Id.
22. PHI refers to all “individually identifiable health information” (“IIHI”) held or transmitted
by a covered entity or business associate, in any form. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2019) (defining protected
health information). IIHI is health information created by a healthcare provider, health plan, employer,
or healthcare clearinghouse that identifies the individual or with respect to which there is a “reasonable
basis to believe” it can be used to identify the individual. Id. (defining individually identifiable health
information).
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administrative, technical, and physical safeguards. 23 Additionally, HHS
published the HIPAA Breach Enforcement Rule which explicitly set out
investigatory procedures for HIPAA violations and a civil money penalty
(“CMP”) schedule for those violations. 24
In 2009, Congress updated HIPAA through the Health Information
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (“HITECH”) 25 with the
purpose of promoting and developing a nationwide health information
technology infrastructure. 26 HITECH built upon the existing HIPAA Privacy
and Security Rules and integrated the use of electronic health record (“EHR”)
systems, resulting in more specific technical requirements for electronic data
sharing. 27 As a way of promoting a new health information technology
infrastructure, HITECH established a “meaningful use” incentive program to
promote EHR adoption and interoperability between hospital systems for the
electronic exchange of patient medical records. 28
Under the HITECH legislation, HHS established the Breach
Notification Rule which requires entities subject to HIPAA to provide
23. See HIPAA Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2019); HIPAA Security Rule, 45 C.F.R.
§§ 160, 164 (2019). For a summary of the Privacy Rule, including a compilation of the relevant code
sections, see Office for Civil Rights, The HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
(Apr. 16, 2015), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/index.html [https://perma.cc/
4EZ7-ZL2W]. For a summary of the Security Rule, including a compilation of the relevant code
sections, see Office for Civil Rights, The Security Rule, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (May 12,
2017), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/index.html [https://perma.cc/V66UJDLN].
24. See HIPAA Enforcement Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 160 (2019). For a summary of the Enforcement
Rule, including a compilation of the relevant code sections, see Office for Civil Rights, The HIPAA
Enforcement Rule, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (June 16, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/
for-professionals/special-topics/enforcement-rule/index.html [https://perma.cc/D7HC-MM4M]. For
a more detailed explanation of PHI and the information that HIPAA covers, see infra Section I.A.3.
25. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
123 Stat. 226 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The majority of
HITECH rules discussed in this paper are also located in the Code of Federal Regulations.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-11(b) (2018) (“[HHS] shall perform the duties . . . in a manner consistent
with the development of a nationwide health information technology infrastructure that allows for the
electronic use and exchange of information.”); see also Office for Civil Rights, HITECH Act Enforcement
Interim Final Rule, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (June 16, 2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/hitech-act-enforcement-interim-finalrule/index.html [https://perma.cc/5S3A-CNGA]. See generally David Blumenthal, Launching HITECH,
362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 382 (2010) (providing background information on the healthcare industry
leading up to the introduction of HITECH).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-14(b)(1) (2018) (“[T]he [HHS] shall . . . adopt an initial set of
standards, implementation specifications, and certification criteria [consistent with this title].”).
28. See id. § 1395w-4(o) (“[I]f the eligible professional is a meaningful EHR user . . . for the EHR
reporting period . . . [the professional] shall be paid . . . from the Supplemental Medical Insurance
Trust Fund.”). For a distilled description of the meaningful se incentive program and goals, see also
Public Health and Promoting Interoperability Programs, Introduction, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/ehrmeaningfuluse/introduction.html [https://perma.cc/K33X9DHY].
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notification following breaches of PHI. 29 Breaches are generally defined as an
impermissible use or disclosure that compromises the security or privacy of
PHI. 30 Following breaches, entities are required to provide notification to the
individuals affected and report the breach to OCR, 31 which works in
collaboration with HHS to enforce HIPAA. In 2013, HHS published the Final
Omnibus Rule, which expanded these notification requirements and provided
more stringent technical updates to the HIPAA Security Rule. 32 The Breach
Notification Rule now requires third parties working with regulated parties to
report breaches 33 and tightens the breach standard to a presumed impermissible
violation. 34
OCR, as the HHS enforcement division for HIPAA, is tasked with
ensuring that regulated entities understand and comply with HIPAA
requirements, increasing the general public’s awareness of their HIPAA rights
and protections, and investigating potential violations. 35 OCR accomplishes
these goals by issuing regulations and guidance that clarify existing HIPAA
implementation, conducting outreach to regulated entities, and providing
technical assistance to resolve substantial noncompliance. 36 Additionally, OCR
pursues investigations based on public complaints of violations and seeks to
resolve claims by obtaining voluntary compliance, corrective action, and/or a
resolution agreement. 37 In rare cases where the regulated entity fails to take

29. See HIPAA Breach Notification Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.400–414 (2019).
30. See id. § 164.402 (defining breach); see also Office for Civil Rights, Breach Notification Rule,
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (July 26, 2013), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/breach-notification/index.html [https://perma.cc/CTH7-VFRQ].
31. § 164.404 (“A covered entity shall, following the discovery of a breach . . . notify each
individual whose unsecured [PHI] has been . . . [compromised] as a result of such breach.”); id.
§ 164.408 (“A covered entity shall, following the discovery of a breach . . . , notify the [OCR].”).
32. See Final Omnibus Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5702 (Jan. 25, 2013) (codified as 45 C.F.R. Parts
160 and 164); see also Office for Civil Rights, Omnibus HIPAA Rulemaking, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS. (Sept. 13, 2019), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/lawsregulations/combined-regulation-text/omnibus-hipaa-rulemaking/index.html [https://perma.cc/935JSQEM].
33. § 164.410 (“A [third party] shall, following the discovery of a breach . . . , notify the covered
entity of such breach.”). The third party here refers to business associates, which is defined in Section
I.A.2.
34. Id. § 164.402 (defining breach and stating that the unauthorized use of PHI is “presumed to
be a breach unless the [entity] . . . demonstrates that there is a low probability that the [PHI] has been
compromised”).
35. See Office for Civil Rights, About Us, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Oct. 8, 2019),
https://www.hhs.gov/ocr/about-us/index.html [https://perma.cc/92F8-MT9U].
36. See id.
37. 45 C.F.R. § 160.312 (2019); see also Office for Civil Rights, How OCR Enforces the HIPAA
Privacy & Security Rules, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (June 7, 2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-enforcement/examples/how-ocr-enforcesthe-hipaa-privacy-and-security-rules/index.html [https://perma.cc/X8QA-ZEZ5].
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action to resolve a HIPAA violation, OCR may impose CMPs 38 or even refer
the case to the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) if the complaint implicates a
potential criminal violation. 39
2. Who Does HIPAA Cover?
HIPAA is applicable only to three types of entities: health plans, 40
clearinghouses,41 and certain healthcare providers. 42 Of those types, “covered”
entities are those that perform transactions, which are defined as the
transmission of information to carry out “financial or administrative activities
related to healthcare.” 43 While not every type of entity interacts with health
information the same way, all covered entities need to comply with the HIPAA
Privacy and Security Rules. Conversely, noncovered entities do not fall within
HIPAA’s reach and therefore do not have to meet its stringent requirements

38. § 160.402 (“[OCR] will impose a civil money penalty . . . if the [OCR] determines the [entity]
has violated [a HIPAA] provision.”); see also Office for Civil Rights, supra note 37.
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2018) (detailing what constitutes a criminal violation of HIPAA
rules); see also Office for Civil Rights, How OCR Enforces, supra note 37 (stating that violations of the
criminal provision of HIPAA may be referred to the DOJ).
40. Health plans cover some healthcare costs for their subscribers. Health plans generally receive
health information regarding a patient’s diagnosis and treatment to determine what portion of those
services to cover. Health plans include an individual or group plan that “provides, or pays the cost of,
medical care.” 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2019) (defining health plan). This may come in many forms,
including government social services (for example, Medicare and Medicaid); private insurance through
employers or educational institutions; private insurance through the Health Insurance Marketplace;
and other public and private sources. See, e.g., Health Insurance Marketplace, HEALTHCARE.GOV,
https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/health-insurance-marketplace-glossary/ [https://perma.cc/7DE53PFM]. The Marketplace provides health plan shopping and enrollment through services based on an
individual’s or family’s income and household information. Id. The Marketplace is a federal program,
although thirteen states run their own marketplaces. The Marketplace in Your State,
HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/marketplace-in-your-state/
[https://perma.cc
/L6HG-F4K5].
41. Healthcare clearinghouses are thought of as the middlemen between covered entities that
create health information and those that maintain health information. Healthcare clearinghouses are
third-party systems that interpret claim data between healthcare providers and insurance companies or
health plans, sending encrypted patient information and interpreting said encryptions. § 160.103
(defining healthcare clearinghouse). Specific functions include: receiving a transaction with health
information that is “nonstandard format or containing nonstandard data content” and assisting with
the conversion into “standard data elements or a standard transaction” for the transmitting covered
entity; or receiving a standard transaction and assisting with the conversion into “nonstandard format
or nonstandard data content” for the receiving covered entity. Id. Examples of healthcare
clearinghouses include billing services, repricing companies, community health management
information systems, and value-added networks and switches. Id.
42. Id. § 160.102(a).
43. Id. § 160.103 (defining transaction). Examples include healthcare claims, healthcare payment,
coordination of benefits, healthcare claim status, enrollment and disenrollment for a health plan,
eligibility for a health plan, healthcare premium payments, referral certification and authorization, first
report of injury, health claims attachments, and healthcare electronic funds transfers. Id.
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for handling and storing data, regardless of what type of information they
have. 44
While healthcare plans and clearinghouses do little more than either pay
for or convert healthcare information, healthcare providers interact with, create,
and maintain health information. Providers fall under the covered entity
definition only if they engage in exchanges of information to carry out a
financial or administrative activity related to healthcare, or “transactions.” 45
Providers can include any person, business, or agency that “furnishe[s], bills, or
is paid for, healthcare in the normal course of business.” 46 Colloquially,
providers can include any healthcare professional who provides health services
and bills for those services, ranging from the individual practitioner to the
largest hospital systems.
Healthcare providers constitute the largest number of all covered entities
and generally interact the most with patients and their health information. As
such, they are at greater risk for noncompliance with HIPAA considering the
various provisions that healthcare providers need to meet. In 2019 alone, there
were 396 violations by healthcare providers, constituting 77.65% of breaches
total. 47
While the covered entities—healthcare providers, plans, and
clearinghouses—cover a majority of clinical treatment and billing, many other
third-party actors are significantly involved in the medical industry. If the third
parties need to handle PHI in any manner, they fall under the business associate
definition under HIPAA and are subject to its Security and Privacy Rules.48
Business associates are third-party persons or organizations that perform
activities on behalf of, or provide certain services to, a covered entity that uses
or discloses PHI. 49 Business associates might create, receive, maintain, or
transmit for or on behalf of a covered entity. When covered entities utilize
business associates, HIPAA requires the parties to sign a business associate
44. Id.
45. Id. § 162 (providing transaction standards established by HIPAA Transactions Rule).
Examples of covered transactions include claims, benefit eligibility queries, and referral authorization
requests. Id. § 160.103.
46. Id. (defining healthcare provider).
47. 2019 Healthcare Data Breach Report, HIPAA J. (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.hipaajournal.com
/2019-healthcare-data-breach-report/ [https://perma.cc/NMV4-ECCD]. Of the total number of
breaches in 2019, health plan breaches constituted 11.57% (59 violations), healthcare clearinghouses
constituted 0.39% (2 violations), and business associates constituted the remaining 23.3% (53
violations). Id. Data pulled from Office for Civil Rights, Breach Portal, Cases Currently Under
Investigation, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (updated daily), https://ocrportal.hhs.gov/ocr
/breach/breach_report.jsf [https://perma.cc/Q86D-6ZFG]. HHS keeps a running list of cases
currently under investigation, also known in the healthcare community as the “Wall of Shame.” What
Is the HIPAA Wall of Shame?, COMPLIANCY GROUP, https://compliancy-group.com/what-is-thehipaa-wall-of-shame/ [https://perma.cc/QYC4-9QAK].
48. See § 160.103 (defining business associate).
49. Id.
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agreement that imposes specific written safeguards for their use or disclosure of
PHI. 50 Business associate agreements must detail the scope and limitations for
use and disclosure by the business associate. 51
HIPAA’s administrative, physical, and technical safeguards are numerous;
however, they are merely guidelines and standards for compliance. HIPAA
requirements are flexible and scalable to allow covered entities to analyze their
own needs and implement solutions appropriate for their specific
environments. 52 What is appropriate for a particular covered entity will depend
on the nature of the covered entity’s business, as well as the covered entity’s
size and resources. 53 In deciding the security standards to use, entities need to
take into account their “size, complexity, and capabilities”; “technical
infrastructure, hardware, and software security capabilities”; the cost of security
measures; and the “probability and cruciality” of risks to PHI. 54
Given the number of various factors and requirements, HIPAA
regulations do not provide a clear determination of what policies each entity
needs to employ to be compliant. For example, a large healthcare conglomerate
that has hospitals and clinics across multiple states will need to consider how to
manage sharing health information within the organization, with insurance
companies or Medicare, and with providers outside of the organization, all while
ensuring that each location has the appropriate technical capabilities to handle
data protection and the appropriate level of access for each employee (such as a
physician, nurse, scheduling assistant, or billing professional), contractor, and
patient (through patient portals). This type of organization has very
complicated needs to ensure that it follows HIPAA requirements, necessitating
a multitude of compliance personnel, advanced hardware to handle data storage,
and secure methods for sharing health information. Contrast this scenario with
a regional hospital that is the only health provider within a 100-mile radius and
handles all the healthcare for a rural community. The regional hospital will need
far less to comply with HIPAA since there is a smaller need to share PHI
outside of the community. Ultimately, HIPAA regulations, while flexible, are
numerous and complex in nature, making it hard for covered entities to ensure
they comply.

50. Id. §§ 164.502(e), 164.504(e) (requiring that covered entities obtain assurance of compliance
with HIPAA when contracting with business associates).
51. Id.
52. Id. § 164.306(b)(1) (“Covered entities and business associates may use any security measures
that allow the [entity] to reasonably and appropriately implement the standards and implementation
specifications as specified in [the HIPAA Security Rule].”).
53. Id. § 164.306(b)(2).
54. Id.
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3. What Information Does HIPAA Cover?
HIPAA protects against unlawful access of patient health data and
requires that covered entities and business associates create safeguards that
ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of protected health
information, or PHI. PHI refers to all “individually identifiable health
information” that is related to the past, present, or future health status of an
individual that is held or transmitted by a covered entity or its business associate
in any form or medium. 55 Additionally, PHI includes health data for which
there is a “reasonable basis” to believe that such health information can be used
to identify an individual patient. 56 This can include information such as
diagnoses, treatment information, hospital bills, medical test results, and
prescription information. 57 Nonmedical information including national
identification numbers (for example, Social Security numbers), and
demographic information such as birth dates, gender, ethnicity, and contact
information can also qualify as PHI. 58
In order for individual data to qualify as PHI, there needs to be some sort
of relationship with health information; sharing nonmedical information that is
identifying alone without any health information does not necessarily classify
the information as PHI. 59 For example, a person’s residential address that is
part of a public tax database would not be PHI since there is no link to health
information. On the other hand, if the same person’s residential address was
listed on a hospital bill it could then qualify as PHI.
Furthermore, the health information must in some way identify the
individual, either directly or via a reasonably possible pathway. 60 Although
patient information such as a date of birth does not in itself identify a singular
person, the combination of the date of birth and the fact that the patient was
treated at a particular outpatient cancer clinic makes it much easier to find the
individual; thus, there is a reasonable basis to believe that the date of birth in a
specific healthcare context is enough to identify a person.
55. Id. § 160.103 (defining protected health information). Health information can still qualify as
PHI even if it is not held or transmitted in electronic media. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id.; see also Office for Civil Rights, Guidance Regarding Methods for De-identification of
Protected Health Information in Accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.hhs.gov
/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/special-topics/de-identification/index.html#protected
[https://perma.cc/37EY-KMZV] (listing examples of PHI). However, there are some examples of
individually identifiable health information that do not qualify as PHI, such as education records
covered by the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 574
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2018)); employment records held by a covered entity in
its role as an employer; and data of persons who have been deceased for more than 50 years. § 160.103.
58. See § 160.103; see also Office for Civil Rights, supra note 57.
59. Office for Civil Rights, supra note 57.
60. § 160.103.
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Conversely, there are no restrictions on sharing PHI that has been deidentified. 61 De-identified information is simply PHI that has been scrubbed or
transformed so that the information is no longer individually identifying or
there is no longer a reasonable basis to believe that the information can be used
to identify an individual. 62 One example of de-identification is the use of
aggregate data. Although aggregate data is derived from individual patient
records from a particular population set, the aggregation is determined through
statistical methods that effectively mask each individual. 63 While HIPAA’s
security requirements still apply to de-identified PHI, covered entities are no
longer subject to normal restrictions for sharing such data. 64
Finally, HIPAA protections do not necessarily follow PHI once it has left
a covered entity or business associate. 65 Under the individual right of access, a
patient can request access to their PHI from a covered entity or even direct the
covered entity to share it with a third-party. 66 Once the PHI has left the
HIPAA-regulated entity to a noncovered entity (including the patient herself),
there are no restrictions on using the PHI and there are also no administrative
or technical safeguards protecting the privacy of the data.
The regulations surrounding what health information is protected under
HIPAA as PHI are complex and further complicated by restrictions on how
that PHI is used by covered entities. 67 This can create doubt among HIPAAregulated entities regarding when it is safe to share PHI outside of their
organization and when such sharing will lead to a HIPAA violation.
4. How Can Entities Use and Disclose PHI Under HIPAA?
As entities subject to regulations under HIPAA, covered entities and
business associates are restricted in the ways that they can share patient data
and the amount they can share. There are four pathways through which PHI
can be used and disclosed: (1) required disclosures by law; (2) permitted uses
61. See Id. § 164.502(d)(2) (providing standards for using and disclosing de-identified PHI); see
also Office for Civil Rights, supra note 57.
62. Id. § 164.514(a) (defining de-identification of PHI). There are two methods for deidentification: the expert determination and safe harbor methods. See id. § 164.514(b). The expert
determination method applies statistical and scientific principles to render the information not
individually identifiable. See id. § 164.514(b)(1). The safe harbor method removes particular identifiers
from the health data. See id. § 164.514(b)(2) (including examples such as names, geographical
identifiers, dates, and phone numbers).
63. For example, a health plan report that lists the average age of persons subscribed to the plan
would not qualify as PHI. See id. § 164.514(a)–(b). Although the report is derived from patient ages
from each health plan’s subscription records, which each qualify as PHI, the report only shows the
aggregated data in which there is no reasonable way to identify any individual patient. See id.
64. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
65. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(1) (2019) (requiring that covered entities and business associates
provide patients with access to their health information upon request).
66. See id.
67. See infra Section I.A.4.
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and disclosures; (3) uses and disclosures that require express authorization from
an individual; 68 and (4) the individual right of access. 69 Except for the
permitted uses and disclosures pathway, the other pathways generally rely on
other actors to allow PHI sharing to go forward. 70
Under the permitted uses and disclosures pathway, covered entities and
business associates have the discretion to share PHI without external actors
prompting the action. 71 Specifically, covered entities are permitted, but not
required, to use and disclose PHI without an individual’s authorization for a
variety of purposes with the most salient reasons being for treatment, payment,
or healthcare operations, also known as “TPO.” 72
Sharing PHI for TPO purposes, however, is also subject to the “minimum
necessary” principle, which requires that a covered entity make reasonable
efforts to use, disclose, and request only the minimum amount of PHI needed
to accomplish the intended purpose. 73 HIPAA does not precisely define what
the minimum necessary principle entails, but instead relies upon the individual
covered entity or business associate to determine its proper scope. 74
68. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a) (2019). Excluding certain exceptions, covered entities and business
associates may not use or disclose PHI without valid authorization from the patient. Id.
69. Id. § 164.502(a)(1) (listing permitted uses and disclosures, required disclosures, and
prohibited uses and disclosures for covered entities and business associates). The individual right of
access itself is a specific instance of a required disclosure. Other required disclosures include to HHS
for purposes of compliance investigation or some other legal requirement. Id. § 164.502(a)(2).
70. For example, the individual right of access allows a patient to request an entity maintaining
her PHI to deliver a copy of that PHI for personal inspection or to send it to a third party, without
restriction on what that third-party entity is. See id. §§ 164.524(a)(1), 164.528(a). Similarly, required
disclosures by law depend on some mandate contained in law (e.g. statute, regulation, or court order)
to compel PHI sharing to a particular government authority or other party. See id. §§ 164.103,
164.512(a). Finally, of particular note, the pathway requiring express authorization from the patient
has very stringent requirements but is essentially a catch-all if the use or disclosure does not fall under
another pathway. See id. § 164.508 (providing for a general rule and specific instances where
authorizations are required). An authorization is a detailed document that gives covered entities
permission to use PHI for specified purposes, typically other than for TPO (treatment, payment, or
healthcare operations) purposes. See id. § 164.508(c); see also Office for Civil Rights, What Is the
Difference Between “Consent” and “Authorization” Under the HIPAA Privacy Rule?, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH
& HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/264/what-is-the-differencebetween-consent-and-authorization/index.html [https://perma.cc/8XRL-6352].
71. § 164.502(a)(1).
72. Additionally, covered entities are allowed to provide PHI: (1) to the individual, (2) where the
individual has an opportunity to agree or object, (3) incident to an otherwise permitted use and
disclosure, (4) for public interest and benefit activities, and (5) limited data set for purposes of research,
public health, or healthcare operations. Id.
73. Id. §§ 164.502(b), 164.514(d)(1)–(4).
74. See id. § 164.514(d)(3) (“[A] covered entity must implement policies and procedures . . . that
limit the [PHI] disclosed to the amount reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose of the
disclosure.”); see also Office for Civil Rights, Minimum Necessary Requirement, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS. (July 26, 2013), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance
/minimum-necessary-requirement/index.html [https://perma.cc/3VAW-FESS] (requiring covered
entities to evaluate their practices and enhance safeguards to protect against inappropriate PHI access).
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Unfortunately, there is scarce judicial clarification for what the minimum
necessary principal entails, 75 and HHS has only provided clarification through
a series of FAQs 76 and explicit carveouts in its regulations.
The main regulatory carveout provides that the minimum necessary
principle does not apply to transactions between covered healthcare providers
for healthcare treatment 77 purposes. 78 Other regulatory carveouts include
disclosures to a patient under the individual right of access, disclosure done with
express authorization from the patient, disclosures made to HHS, and other
disclosures as required by law. 79 As such, most activities for TPO purposes are
subject to the minimum necessary principle, except for the particular providerto-provider situation for treatment purposes. 80 The minimum necessary
principle, though seemingly flexible in application, looms over covered entities
and business associates in every TPO action they take.
The OCR FAQs cover topics such as the purpose behind the minimum
necessary principle, how the principle interacts and conflicts with certain
HIPAA regulations and purposes, and specific examples where the principle
does or does not apply. 81 While the FAQs are helpful in clarifying many
fundamental questions about the minimum necessary principle and why HHS
implemented such a restriction, the FAQs provide only a few particular
examples of permitted PHI usage and do not provide guidance in many other
health-related scenarios. Beyond the restrictions created by the minimum
necessary principle, HIPAA-regulated entities have broad authority to use and
disclose PHI if done for TPO purposes.

75. See, e.g., Citizens for Health v. Leavitt, 428 F.3d 167, 173 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting from the
regulation but not providing additional clarification); Harrold-Jones v. Drury, 422 P.3d 568, 573
(Alaska 2018) (confirming that minimum necessary does not apply for disclosures for legal proceeding,
but not providing general clarification); Stevens ex rel. Stevens v. Hickman Cmty. Health Care Servs.,
Inc., 418 S.W.3d 547, 558 (Tenn. 2013) (directly quoting the regulation without clarification).
76. See Office for Civil Rights, FAQ: Minimum Necessary, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/minimum-necessary/index.html [https://perma.cc
/M96U-79MH].
77. Treatment is further defined later in this section. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
78. § 164.502(b)(2)(i). The final rule from HHS removed the minimum necessary principal for
uses and disclosures of PHI between providers for treatment purposes. 65 Fed. Reg. 82,461, 82,712–
13 (Dec. 28, 2000). Commentators to the proposed rule argued that the application of the principal for
providers would be “contrary to sound medical practice, increase medical errors, and lead to an increase
in liability.” Id. at 82,712. Additionally, commentators mentioned that the “complexity of medicine” is
such that it would be unreasonable to know exactly what medical information is relevant to another
caregiver in developing proper diagnosis and treatment. Id. at 82,713.
79. § 164.502(b)(2)(ii), (iv), (v).
80. See id. § 164.502(b).
81. Office for Civil Rights, supra note 74. Specific examples include whether the minimum
necessary principle applies to medical students, for documentation to an external institutional review
board, for worker’s compensation systems, and for plaintiffs or defendants requesting information in
litigation. Id.
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Treatment encompasses the medical care provided to patients and is the
broadest category of TPO. Treatment generally means the “provision,
coordination, or management of healthcare and related services” between
healthcare providers or with a third party, consultation between healthcare
providers regarding a patient, or patient referral from one healthcare provider
to another. 82 Treatment includes traditional treatment and diagnosis, but also
includes making and receiving referrals as well as coordination or management
of healthcare and related services by a provider, even if the action is through a
hired third party.
Payment encompasses various activities of healthcare providers to obtain
payment or reimbursement for their services in addition to activities of health
plans to obtain premiums, fulfill coverage responsibilities, provide benefits
under the plan, and provide reimbursement for the provision of healthcare. 83
Examples of this include determining eligibility or coverage under a plan and
adjudicating claims; risk adjustments; billing and collection activities; reviewing
healthcare services for medical necessity, coverage, justification of charges, and
the like; utilization review activities; and disclosures to consumer reporting
services. 84
Healthcare operations constitute certain administrative, financial, legal,
and quality improvement activities of a covered entity necessary to run its
business and support the functions of treatment and payment. 85 Activities that
fall under healthcare operations are specifically enumerated in the regulation.86
Examples include conducting quality assessments and improvement activities,
population-based activities related to improving healthcare or reducing
healthcare costs, case management and care coordination, 87 and numerous other
activities. 88
Under the TPO exceptions, covered entities and business associates have
relatively broad authority to share PHI without a patient’s express
authorization. For the purposes of care coordination, this seems beneficial in
sharing PHI to healthcare actors at various stages of a patient’s treatment. But
despite this seemingly broad authority, HIPAA-regulated entities must still
consider the minimum necessary principle in their uses and disclosures under
TPO. Although the minimum necessary principle is a standard, and as such is
flexible in its application, it relies on covered entities and business associates to
determine what that “minimum necessary” amount of PHI is. Additionally, the
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2019) (defining treatment).
Id. (defining payment).
See id.
Id. (defining healthcare operations).
See id.
See infra Section I.C.
§ 164.501 (defining healthcare operations).
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minimum necessary principle has vague wording with little clarification
provided by HHS. As such, HIPAA-regulated entities will generally err on the
side of sharing as little as possible for fear of violating HIPAA. 89 The minimum
necessary principle’s interaction with TPO makes fully effective care
coordination an insurmountable challenge, as discussed in Section I.C.
B.

Care Coordination and the Medically Indigent

Care coordination has been defined as intentionally “organizing patient
care activities and sharing information among all of the participants concerned
with a patient’s care to achieve safer and more effective care,” 90 the
“management of interdependencies among [healthcare-related] tasks,” 91 and
various other definitions. 92 Care coordination may include: (1) functions to
“ensure that [a] patient’s needs and preferences are met over time”; (2) sharing
of information across the “people, functions, and sites” of the care process; and
(3) deliberate organization of care activities across participants in the care
process, including the patient herself. 93 Care coordination has even been
included as part of case management, which is the “activity that assists
individuals . . . in gaining access to medical, social, educational or other
services”—but it does not consist of the underlying service itself. 94
While the definition of care coordination is inconsistent, the ultimate goal
of care coordination is to meet the needs and preferences of the patient through
the delivery of high-quality and high-value healthcare. 95 This means
communicating a patient’s particular needs and preferences at the right time to
the right people involved in guiding safe, appropriate, and effective care. Well89. See infra notes 155–60 and accompanying text.
90. See Care Coordination, supra note 5.
91. Jody Hoffer Gittell, Coordinating Mechanisms in Care Provider Groups: Relational Coordination
as a Mediator and Input Uncertainty as a Moderator of Performance Effects, 48 MGMT. SCI. 1408, 1408
(2002).
92. For other state definitions of care coordination, see generally Jane Hyatt Thorpe & Katherine
Hayes, Selected Provisions from Integrated Care RFPs and Contracts: Care Coordination, INTEGRATED
CARE RESOURCE CTR. 3–4 (July 2013), https://www.integratedcareresourcecenter.com/sites
/default/files/ICRC_Care_Coordination_FINAL_7_29_13_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9HNZ-4P8F]
(summarizing care coordination definitions from Arizona, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Tennessee, and
Texas).
93. AM. NURSES ASS’N, THE VALUE OF NURSING CARE COORDINATION 1–2 (2012),
https://www.nursingworld.org/~4afc0d/globalassets/practiceandpolicy/health-policy/carecoordination-white-paper-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/MJ7P-86XM].
94. Medicaid Program; Optional State Plan Case Management Services, 72 Fed. Reg. 68,077,
60,878–79 (Dec. 4, 2007) (codified as 42 C.F.R. §§ 431, 440, 441 (2019)) (internal quotations omitted).
For a detailed, nonexhaustive list of case management functions provided by the Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Services (“CMS”), see generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICARE SERVS.,
INSTRUCTIONS, TECHNICAL GUIDE AND REVIEW CRITERIA: APPLICATION FOR A 1915(C) HOME
AND
COMMUNITY-BASED WAIVER 105 (2015), http://nasddds.org/uploads/documents
/Version3.5InstructionsJan2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/57C6-SUUY].
95. Care Coordination, supra note 5.
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designed and targeted care coordination can improve outcomes for all parties
involved—patients, providers, and payers. 96 Care coordination serves to “bend
the cost curve downward” by increasing the efficiency of gathering information
about a patient and thus reducing costs of medical care through collaboration. 97
Additionally, care coordination can “make providers accountable for quality and
outcomes, not just delivering care.” 98
Utilizing care coordination strategies has been shown to improve the
health outcomes of patients in several different contexts, including primary
care, 99 acute care, 100 and long-term care. 101 Care coordination can reduce the
number of hospital days, hospital readmissions, emergency department visits,
and home healthcare episodes while also saving significant healthcare costs. 102
Additionally, care coordination can be an incredible tool for improving health
outcomes in rural communities, many of which have higher rates of poor
physical and mental health, poverty, and unemployment than the state or
national average. 103 Furthermore, care coordination can increase patient

96. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
97. Y. Tony Yang & Mark R. Meiners, Care Coordination and the Expansion of Nursing Scopes of
Practice, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 93, 93 (2014).
98. David Ivers, Conflict-Free Case Management on Collision Course with Integrated Care, 28
HEALTH L., Apr. 2016, at 19, 23.
99. Primary care coordination, also known as guided care, aims to care for patients with chronic
diseases and conditions such as heart disease and cancer. NEJM Catalyst, What is Care Coordination?,
MASS. MED. SOC’Y (Jan. 1, 2018), https://catalyst.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/CAT.18.0291
[https://perma.cc/ZG7C-HJVE].
100. Acute care coordination is intended for patients who suffer from acute health problems such
as a stroke or heart attack, which require critical and emergency care. Id.
101. Long-term or post-acute care coordination is intended for patients who are rehabilitating from
acute conditions or need long-term healthcare facilities, necessitating movement between facilities
based on the patient’s progression. Id.
102. AM. HOSPITAL ASS’N, THE ROLE OF POST-ACUTE CARE IN NEW CARE DELIVERY
MODELS 5–10 (2015) (highlighting case studies where implementing post-acute care coordination has
improved hospital readmission rates and improved patient satisfaction when being transferred between
healthcare facilities); Bruce Leff et al., Guided Care and the Cost of Complex Healthcare: A Preliminary
Report, 15 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 555, 555 (2009) (finding, on average, that patients in a guided care
subset experienced 24% fewer hospital days, 37% fewer skilled nursing facility days, 15% fewer
emergency department visits, 29% fewer home healthcare episodes, and saved $1364 per patient); Dave
Russell, Mary VorderBruegge & Suzanne M. Burns, Effect of an Outcomes-Managed Approach to Care of
Neuroscience Patients by Acute Care Nurse Practitioners, 11 AM. J. CRITICAL CARE 353, 353 (2002)
(finding patients in an acute care subset had significantly shorter overall length of stay, shorter mean
length of stay in intensive care, and lower rates of infections); Martha Hostetter et al., Guided Care: A
Structured Approach to Providing Comprehensive Primary Care for Complex Patients, COMMONWEALTH
FUND (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/case-study/2016/oct/guidedcare-structured-approach-providing-comprehensive-primary?redirect_source=/publications/casestudies/2016/oct/guided-care [https://perma.cc/8ND2-Y96B] (finding patients in a guided care subset
showed a 15% reduction in hospital admissions, a 48.7% reduction in 30-day readmissions, a 20.7%
reduction in hospital days, and a 17.4% reduction in emergency department visits).
103. Pat Conway et al., Rural Health Networks and Care Coordination: Health Care Innovation in
Frontier Communities To Improve Patient Outcomes and Reduce Health Care Costs, 27 J. HEALTH CARE
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confidence in their healthcare team, improve patient engagement, improve
health outcomes, and reduce costs. 104 As such, care coordination has proven to
be a flexible and vital tool for managing care for people of disparate
socioeconomic backgrounds across a variety of health contexts.
While there are many different care coordination models, they all envision
a patient’s health management through strategic and cooperative team care,
requiring integration between all medical providers, payers, social service
agencies, and community-based support programs. 105 As such, nonclinical
services such as social services and community-based support programs are
increasingly “associated with better satisfaction with care, quality of care,
quality of life, and survival.” 106 Effective community health and social workers
must have the ability to “work cooperatively with other members of the
multidisciplinary treatment team that are directly involved in a patient’s
care.” 107 In this sense, care coordination can be thought of as a “team sport” that
requires strong infrastructure, resources, leadership, and culture to effectively

FOR POOR UNDERSERVED 91, 107 (2016) (observing a rural population in Ely, Minnesota and finding

some patient quality of life improvement with drastically reduced emergency department use).
104. See Sara Heath, Care Coordination Across Provider Networks Creates Patient Trust, PATIENT
ENGAGEMENT HIT (Nov. 20, 2017), https://patientengagementhit.com/news/care-coordinationacross-provider-networks-creates-patient-trust [https://perma.cc/RD2S-CDWA] (describing how care
team collaboration directly influences patient and family trust); Mark M. Nunlist et al., Using Health
Confidence To Improve Patient Outcomes, 23 FAM. PRAC. MGMT, Nov./Dec. 2016, at 21, 21–22
(mentioning care coordination interventions as improving patient confidence).
105. See, e.g., John D. Burchard, Eric J. Bruns & Sara N. Burchard, The Wraparound Process, in
COMMUNITY TREATMENT FOR YOUTH 1 (2002) (focusing on intensive, individualized care
management for youths within complex service delivery approaches); CATHERINE CRAIG, DOUG
EBBY & JOHN WHITTINGTON, CARE COORDINATION MODEL: BETTER CARE AT LOWER COST
FOR PEOPLE WITH MULTIPLE HEALTH AND SOCIAL NEEDS 1 (2011) (supporting a methodical
approach to delivering coordination services); Victoria M. Rozzi et al., AIMS: A Care Coordination
Model to Improve Patient Health Outcomes, 41 HEALTH & SOC. WORK 191, 191 (2016) (advocating for a
social work interventional model); Community Care Coordination—The Marriage of Health and Social
Service Providers, ECCOVIA SOLUTIONS (July 6, 2017), https://eccoviasolutions.com/community-carecoordination-the-marriage-of-health-and-social-service-providers/
[https://perma.cc/J76F-7UED]
(recommending a community-based health neighborhood including health providers and community
support
providers);
Overview,
NURSE-FAMILY
PARTNERSHIP
(2020),
https://
www.nursefamilypartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/NFP-Overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/
EKL6-UWW4] (creating an evidence-based home visiting program that pairs low income first-time
mothers with maternal and child health nurses); Program of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/long-term-servicessupports/program-all-inclusive-care-elderly/index.html [https://perma.cc/WB2H-BKGU] (generating
a comprehensive service package that allows the elderly to remain in the community rather than in a
nursing home).
106. Patricia J. Volland et al., The Transitional Care and Comprehensive Care Coordination Debate,
GENERATIONS, Winter 2012–13, at 13, 16.
107. Yang & Meiners, supra note 97, at 98 (discussing the importance of social services for hospital
transition programs).
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support the synchronized efforts, communication, and collaboration of
multidisciplinary provider teams. 108
An example of care coordination in action illustrates how important it can
be in improving long-term health outcomes. Suppose a patient arrives at the
emergency department (“ED”) with an unknown health condition and
symptoms including frequent urination, increased thirst, and increased hunger.
The ED facility triages our patient based on an initial determination of the
severity of her condition. Since her symptoms do not seem immediately lifethreatening, her ED physician or nurse then evaluates her condition to
determine immediate treatments and suggests subsequent labs or tests via the
patient’s EHR.
Our patient is then transferred out of the ED to another department,
possibly an outpatient clinic, where another provider takes over. The provider,
typically an attending physician or nurse, views the patient’s EHR and, based
on the ED provider’s recommendation, performs initial treatments and submits
imaging, lab, and consult orders. Our patient continues to be shuffled around
to other departments, possibly radiology, 109 nephrology, 110 or endocrinology, 111
while a plethora of healthcare providers access the patient’s EHR and enter
orders, results, and comments.
Finally, our patient’s attending physician presents the patient’s diagnosis:
Type 2 diabetes. 112 The physician develops a care plan around the disease that
108. NEJM Catalyst, supra note 99.
109. Radiology uses imaging techniques such as X-ray, computed tomography (“CT”), and
magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) to diagnose and treat diseases. Nat’l Cancer Inst., Radiology,
NAT’L INST. HEALTH, https://www.cancer.gov/publications/dictionaries/cancer-terms/def/radiology
[https://perma.cc/HM2H-NFQ2].
110. Nephrology is a specialty that involves diagnosing and treating kidney disease. Nat’l Cancer
Inst., Nephrologist, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, https://www.cancer.gov/publications/dictionaries/cancerterms/def/nephrologist [https://perma.cc/2HGF-KPMU].
111. Endocrinology involves diagnosing and treating disorders of the endocrine system, which
contains glands and organs that produce hormones. Nat’l Cancer Inst., NCI Dictionary of Cancer Terms,
Endocrinology, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, https://www.cancer.gov/publications/dictionaries/cancerterms/def/endocrinology [https://perma.cc/LE3U-CCGH].
112. Diabetes is a chronic disease characterized by elevated levels of blood sugar. Diabetes:
Overview, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/health-topics/diabetes#tab=tab_1
[https://perma.cc/A84J-T9JZ]. Type 2 diabetes occurs when the body becomes resistant to insulin, a
hormone that reduces blood sugar levels, or fails to make enough insulin. Id. Symptoms include those
described at the beginning of the scenario: frequent urination, increased thirst, increased hunger, in
addition to unintended weight loss, blurred vision, headaches, fatigue, slow healing of cuts, and itchy
skin. Diabetes: Symptoms, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/health-topics
/diabetes#tab=tab_2 [https://perma.cc/JK4M-4BMK]. Approximately 422 million people worldwide
suffer from diabetes, particularly in low- and middle-income countries, with 1.6 million deaths per year
attributable to diabetes. Diabetes: Overview, supra. As of a 2020 Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention report, 34.2 million U.S. people—or 10.5% of the U.S. population—suffer from diabetes,
with an estimated 7.3 million people undiagnosed. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
NATIONAL DIABETES STATISTICS REPORT, 2020, 2 (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/pdfs
/data/statistics/national-diabetes-statistics-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8YX-XLYB] (providing
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involves diabetes education, lifestyle changes to diet and exercise, and insulin
medication (for example, metformin 113). Lastly, the physician recommends a
follow-up with a diabetes specialist and discharges the patient.
The patient returns home and initially follows the physician’s
recommendations, adjusting her diet and increasing exercise, but soon relapses
into her old habits, finding it too complicated and emotionally taxing to manage
her chronic condition alone. 114 Years later, she suffers from a severe diabetic
coma, loses consciousness, and is rushed to the ED again. This time, she is not
so lucky and suffers severe long-term health complications. 115
The above scenario features many aspects of care coordination within a
single hospital organization. At the ED, the patient’s care team may include the
ED physician, nurse, triage provider, and registration staff. Once the patient is
transferred to another department, her care team may include general
interdisciplinary providers, clinical informatics, radiology, laboratory, and
specialty providers. Within a hospital system (a single covered entity) all
providers likely have full access to each patient’s EHR and can easily view
previous treatments, outstanding or completed lab results, and general
information about the patient. 116

estimated percentages as of 2018). Additionally, 88 million people had prediabetes, characterized by
consistent elevated blood sugar levels not yet at the threshold to diagnose type 2 diabetes. Id. at 8.
113. Metformin is a first-line medication prescribed for patients diagnosed with type 2 diabetes,
particularly for patients who are overweight. See Metformin, MEDLINE PLUS, https://medlineplus.gov
/druginfo/meds/a696005.html [https://perma.cc/7SB9-L9UR] (last updated Mar. 15, 2020).
Metformin acts by decreasing blood sugar levels. Id.
114. In fact, only sixteen percent of diabetic patients report fully adhering to the recommended
lifestyle changes. Joseph C. Kvedar et al., Digital Medicine’s March on Chronic Disease, 34 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 239, 240–41 (2016).
115. Long-term complications of diabetes include cardiovascular disease, vision loss and eventual
blindness, chronic kidney disease (which requires dialysis or kidney transplantation), neuropathy
leading to foot ulcers or even amputation, or in severe cases, death. Diabetes: Symptoms, supra note 112.
116. However, in some hospitals, not all providers operate as a single covered entity. For example,
independent physician groups may operate within a hospital through a “timeshare,” with hospitals
renting out space, equipment, and services on a nonexclusive, “as needed” basis. See Kim Stanger,
Physician Timeshare Agreements: New Stark Option for Sharing Space with Visiting Specialists and Others,
HOLLAND & HART (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.hollandhart.com/physician-timeshare-arrangementsnew-stark-option [https://perma.cc/ELU9-34KG]; see also 42 C.F.R. § 411.357(y) (2019) (listing
requirements for the “timeshare” exception to the anti-kickback and physician self-referral laws). Many
specialty functions, such as radiology and lab work, are often contracted out to different organizations
that rent space from the hospital. See Stanger, supra. In an era of increased hospital consolidation, health
organizations are dealing with a number of separate legal entities operating within one hospital, likely
needing to work through interoperability concerns (due to having different EHR systems) and any
potential business associate agreement in order to facilitate easy transmission of PHI. For more
information about Stark laws (anti-kickback and physician self-referral laws), see generally Office of
Inspector General, A Roadmap for New Physicians, Fraud & Abuse Laws, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/physician-education/01laws.asp [https://perma.cc/MB8U8VS6]; Anti-kickback Statute and Physician Self-Referral Laws (Start Laws), AM. SOC’Y
ANESTHESIOLOGISTS,
https://www.asahq.org/quality-and-practice-management/managing-your-
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Outside of the hospital system, primary care providers, specialists, case
workers, or other third-party social service workers generally do not have the
same type of access to a patient’s EHR and therefore cannot make the most
educated clinical decisions based on a full picture of the patient’s health, social,
and psychological situation. In our hypothetical, for example, full access to the
patient’s EHR for care coordination purposes could have helped her find
diabetes support groups or diabetes-friendly meal services to help manage her
chronic condition, even without her explicitly seeking those services out. Her
providers could securely share her PHI with third-party entities who could then
work with the patient to create a plan that she could adhere to. By freely sharing
her PHI within a care coordination model, a comprehensive group of actors
could support the patient in managing her disease. Chronic diseases, like
diabetes, typically have several risk factors that increase a person’s chances of
either exacerbating the disease or developing significant disease-related health
complications. 117 Many risk factors and extraneous conditions might not be
detected in a single outpatient clinic visit and require long-term monitoring and
frequent check-ins, something that can be properly organized through a fully
open care coordination model.
For the medically indigent 118 and those suffering from chronic conditions,
coordinated care involves a variety of sources including healthcare providers,
social service agencies, and community-based support programs. One approach
is through hospitals that support multi-disciplinary teams that coordinate a full
spectrum of care—exemplified in many community hospital systems.
Community hospitals are governed locally, have the ability to partner with
larger systems while maintaining community roots, play a large economic role
in the area they serve, and are generally the only acute care provider in the

practice/timely-topics-in-payment-and-practice-management/anti-kickback-statute-and-physicianself-referral-laws-stark-laws [https://perma.cc/U4AQ-BUUG].
117. For example, risk factors for diabetes-related complications include smoking, being
overweight and obesity, physical inactivity, high A1C (blood sugar), high blood pressure, and high
cholesterol. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 112, at 9.
118. Medically indigent adults are defined as persons who do not have health insurance and are at
the same time not eligible for other healthcare coverage such as Medicare, Medicaid, or private
insurance. Beth E. Quill, Medically Indigent, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF IMMIGRANT HEALTH (S. Loue &
M. Sajatovic eds., 2012) https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-1-4419-56590_496 [https://perma.cc/T833-D6MX]; see also Robert H. Christmas, Medically Indigent Adults, 2
HEALTH MARKETING Q., no. 4, 1985, at 7, 8 (describing the lack of access to care for medically
indigent individuals in a two-tiered system). Various agencies including governmental entities and
public hospitals have put forth different definitions of medical indigency. For a review of various
definitions, see generally Lynn Naliboff & Dorothy T. Lang, Expanding Access to Health Care: Written
Eligibility Standards for the Medically Indigent, 13 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 848, 848–50 (1980)
(summarizing legal definitions, governmental approaches, and eligibility standards for public hospitals
of medical indigency).
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area. 119 As such, community hospitals are perfectly placed to act as facilitators
of care coordination for healthcare services and other community-based services
such as social welfare and charities. Community hospitals routinely provide care
to the sickest populations by virtue of being the only accessible provider of
healthcare services. 120 Thus, it is imperative for them to develop adequate and
comprehensive care coordination models to address the needs of their patient
population.
One such example is Hennepin County Medical Center (“HCMC”)—a
safety-net community hospital featuring a comprehensive academic medical
center and public teaching hospital, with multiple hospital systems in
Minneapolis, Minnesota and surrounding areas. HCMC is a nationallyrecognized Level 1 Adult Trauma Center 121 and Level 1 Pediatric Trauma
Center and boasts the largest emergency department in the state. 122 HCMC
believes that many clinical interventions are ineffective unless pursued in
coordination with other county departments or external social agencies. 123 Thus,
HCMC works with many community-based services including organizations
that help low-income individuals with housing placements, finding consistent
sources of food, and identifying paths to heal families who entered into child
protection systems. 124 HCMC is just one hospital system of many that utilize
care coordination in a holistic approach for treating individuals by involving
external services such as social welfare and charities.
Another such example is Community Care of North Carolina (“CCNC”),
which is a public-private partnership sponsored by the North Carolina
Department of Health and Human Services and the Division of Health
Benefits. 125 CCNC is comprised of fourteen regional networks of physicians,
nurses, pharmacists, hospitals, health departments, social service agencies, and
119. The Modern Definition of a Community Hospital, BECKER’S HOSP. REV.,
https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-management-administration/the-moderndefinition-of-a-community-hospital.html [https://perma.cc/QH8W-LR57].
120. Id.
121. Level I Trauma Centers provide the highest level of surgical care for trauma patients. These
criteria are established by the American College of Surgeons. See Verification, Review, and Consultation
(VRC) Program, AM. C. SURGEONS, https://www.facs.org/quality-programs/trauma/tqp/centerprograms/vrc [https://perma.cc/DTJ6-Z5NG].
122. HCMC Receives National Award for Population Health, HENNEPIN CTY. MED. CTR. NEWS
(June 21, 2013), https://hcmcnews.org/2013/06/21/hcmc-receives-national-award-for-populationhealth/ [https://perma.cc/3DSA-7ZEH].
123. See
generally
About
Hennepin
Health
Care,
HENNEPIN
HEALTHCARE,
https://www.hennepinhealthcare.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/H3PK-RS2E] (“We partner with
our community, our patients and their families to ensure access to outstanding care while improving
health and wellness through teaching, patient and community education, and research.”).
124. See id.
125. Community Care of North Carolina/Carolina ACCESS (CCNC/CA), N.C. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS., https://medicaid.ncdhhs.gov/providers/programs-and-services/community-care-northcarolinacarolina-access-ccncca [https://perma.cc/R6FD-M7H2].
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other community organizations. 126 These medical professionals utilize care
coordination to provide healthcare to individuals with complex health needs
through the patient-centered medical home model. 127 In that model, the
primary care physician takes lead of the patient’s care plan, coordinating across
various settings and involving all actors who provide care to the patient. 128
Furthermore, there is a hodgepodge of third-party services providing
nonmedical care that can be involved in care coordination. Such services can
include free transport service to hospital facilities, 129 temporary housing
facilities intended for families that travel out-of-town to receive medical care, 130
food services for those too sick to shop and cook for themselves, 131 and legal
services, 132 to name a few. Unless these services are already partnered with
hospital organizations as business associates, 133 there will be delay in
communication between the hospital with the third-party services. These
communication times can be even further delayed by variations in the nature
and volume of information requested, whether or not the data is held by a
standardized EHR, the third party’s capabilities for receiving such data, and
any state law regulations that further restrict data sharing. 134 These delays could

126. NCIOM, UNDERSTANDING COMMUNITY CARE OF NORTH CAROLINA 1,
http://nciom.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/CCNC-Primer-FINAL-4-26-18.pdf [https://perma.cc
/BF78-QXQV].
127. Id.
128. Defining the PCMH, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY,
https://pcmh.ahrq.gov/page/defining-pcmh [https://perma.cc/4CWY-XQNG].
129. See, e.g., Chris Webber, Introducing Uber Health, Removing Transportation as a Barrier to Care,
UBER (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.uber.com/newsroom/uber-health/ [https://perma.cc/HVD6-XLP8]
(promising “reliable, comfortable transportation for patients”); WINGS OF HOPE,
https://wingsofhope.ngo/ [https://perma.cc/U5JA-SVYK] (“[T]he Medical Relief & Air Transport
(MAT) program serves patients throughout the Midwest.”).
130. See, e.g., RONALD MCDONALD HOUSE CHARITIES, https://www.rmhc.org/
[https://perma.cc/KB52-QM3H] (“A place for families to rest and regroup right in the hospital”);
Target House, ST. JUDE CHILDREN’S RES. HOSP., https://www.stjude.org/treatment/patientresources/while-here/housing/target-house.html [https://perma.cc/7RUG-TSJ9] (providing “an
apartment-style housing facility just three miles from the hospital”); Tri Delta Place, ST. JUDE
CHILDREN’S RES. HOSP., https://www.stjude.org/treatment/patient-resources/while-here/housing
/tri-delta-place.html [https://perma.cc/39U3-CEPV] (providing “comfortable, fun and patient safe
housing . . . on the St. Jude campus”).
131. See, e.g., PROJECT ANGEL FOOD, https://www.angelfood.org/ [https://perma.cc/DFA5S52T] (“Project Angel Food prepares and delivers healthy meals to feed people impacted by serious
illness.”); MEALS ON WHEELS AM., https://www.mealsonwheelsamerica.org/ [https://perma.cc
/X3KQ-KETY] (helping seniors “age with dignity and without fear of hunger”).
132. See, e.g., LEGAL AID N.C., http://www.legalaidnc.org/get-help/self-help-library/healthinsurance [https://perma.cc/L5Z6-633E] (offering to help health insurance applicants “understand . . .
options,” access financial help, and complete enrollment).
133. See supra Section I.A.2. Business associates also need corresponding business associate
agreements that capture the scope of the information the business associate can share.
134. 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b) (2019) (allowing state law to have a more stringent requirement than
already provided by HIPAA).
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jeopardize timely medical care or even deter a potential patient from seeking
care altogether.
C.

Care Coordination Under HIPAA

Although permitted disclosures under HIPAA appear to grant a broad
scope for covered entities to share PHI for care coordination purposes, in
actuality, this scope is limited by the statutory definitions of permitted
disclosures within the “minimum necessary” principle. 135
Care coordination appears to fall under either the “treatment” or
“healthcare operations” prongs of TPO permitted uses and disclosures. As
noted earlier, “treatment” means the “provision, coordination, or management
of healthcare and related services” by healthcare providers, and can include the
coordination or management of healthcare in collaboration with a third party. 136
“Healthcare operations” means the activities of a covered entity related to their
HIPAA-covered healthcare functions including “population-based activities
relating to . . . case management and care coordination.” 137 Population-based
activities, or research and medical care activities based on population health,
involve looking at activities in order to improve the aggregate health outcome
of a particular population of individuals. 138 This could take the form of studying
all patients in a given geographic location who suffer from the same chronic
disease in order to improve the overall health for these patients. HIPAA

135. Id. §§ 164.502(b), 164.514(d).
136. Id. § 164.501 (defining treatment); supra text accompanying note 82. Other activities that fall
under the “treatment” definition are consultation between healthcare providers regarding a patient and
patient referral between healthcare providers. Id.
137. § 164.501 (defining healthcare operations). Other activities that fall under the “healthcare
operations” definition are conducting quality assessment and improvement activities; reviewing
competence or qualifications of given healthcare professionals; reviewing health insurance benefit costs;
conducting medical review, legal services, and auditing functions; business planning and development;
business management; and general administrative activities. Id.
138. See David Kindig & Greg Stoddart, What Is Population Health?, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 380,
380 (2003); see also What Is Population Health?, MILKEN INST. SCH. PUB. HEALTH (Apr. 15, 2015)
https://mha.gwu.edu/what-is-population-health/ [https://perma.cc/HA4F-NQBM] (interviewing
healthcare leaders to define the term “population health”).
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permits these activities if a covered entity (healthcare provider or health plan)
sends the relevant PHI directly 139 to the requesting covered entity. 140
While HIPAA generally supports care coordination for either pathway—
treatment or healthcare operations—certain restrictions apply concerning the
purpose for which covered entities can use patient information. Specifically, a
covered entity “may use or disclose [PHI]” for a variety of reasons, two of which
are most applicable to care coordination. 141 First and most simply, a covered
entity may disclose PHI for the purpose of medical treatment activities
performed by a healthcare provider. 142 Second, a covered entity may disclose
PHI for the purposes of healthcare operations activities for another covered
entity. 143 This second reason is applicable only if three certain conditions are
met: (1) both covered entities currently have, or have had, a relationship with
the individual whose PHI is being requested; (2) the PHI pertains to that
particular relationship; and (3) the disclosure falls under the HIPAA definition
of healthcare operations. 144
Along with the statutory definitional restrictions, covered entities must
follow the minimum necessary principle, which requires that a covered entity
make reasonable efforts to only use, disclose, and request the minimum amount
of PHI needed to accomplish the intended purpose. 145 As mentioned
139. Sharing PHI between covered entities (also known as health information exchange) through
their EHR systems requires that both systems comply with HIPAA’s Privacy and Security Rules and
be interoperable, meaning that the technology enables the secure exchange of PHI without special
effort on the part of the user. 42 U.S.C. § 300jj(9) (2018); see also Interoperability, HEALTHIT (May 9,
2019), https://www.healthit.gov/topic/interoperability [https://perma.cc/SRZ2-2D2C]. In practice,
interoperability is challenging since there are a multitude of EHR software companies with different
clinical terminologies, technical specifications, and functional capabilities, all existing without one
standard interoperability format. See Miriam Reisman, EHRs: The Challenge of Making Electronic Data
Usable and Interoperable, 42 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 572, 572–73 (2017). Furthermore, EHR
interoperability has a significant cultural obstacle, requiring the collaboration between patients,
providers, software vendors, legislators, and health information technology professionals. Id. at 573.
Even within a single hospital system, one EHR system may be used for inpatient services, another
system for outpatient services, and other systems for ancillary services such as lab work, oncology
services, pharmacy, and patient portals. Interoperability has been steadily improving, especially for
acute care hospitals, but is still far from the level necessary to seamlessly use, share, and integrate PHI
into EHR systems. See Don Rucker & Talisha Searcy, Acute Care Hospitals Are More Interoperable Than
Ever but Challenges Remain, HEALTHIT (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.healthit.gov/buzzblog/interoperability/acute-care-hospitals-are-more-interoperable-than-ever-but-challenges-remain
[https://perma.cc/H5ET-FL29].
140. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.506(c)(1), (4)(i) (2019).
141. Id. § 164.506(c). A covered entity may also use or disclose PHI for its own TPO purposes;
for disclosure of PHI to another covered entity or healthcare provider for payment activities of entity
receiving information; and, if the covered entity participates in an organized healthcare arrangement,
for purpose of healthcare operations enumerated in the arrangement. Id. § 164.506(c)(1), (3), (5).
142. Id. § 164.506(c)(2).
143. Id. § 164.506(c)(4); see also The HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 23.
144. § 164.506(c)(4); see also The HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 23.
145. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(b), 164.514(d) (2019).
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previously, 146 the minimum necessary principle is a standard that is vaguely
worded and requires HIPAA-regulated entities to interpret the appropriate
scope of PHI they can share in each scenario. The minimum necessary principle
does have explicit carveouts where the principle does not apply, including one
for transactions between covered healthcare providers for treatment purposes,
including care coordination. 147 However, this exception does not apply when a
covered entity shares PHI with parties who are not healthcare providers, such
as community support groups or social workers. 148 Likewise, disclosures related
to care coordination but for nontreatment activities, such as population-based
activities, 149 claims management, 150 review of healthcare services for
appropriateness of care, 151 utilization reviews, 152 and formulary development, 153
are still subject to the minimum necessary principle. 154
The minimum necessary principle, although flexible given a covered
entity’s actions, also makes those same covered entities reluctant to share more
than what is explicitly permitted. Additionally, due to the vagueness and
complexity of TPO exceptions, many covered entities are unwilling to share
PHI for the purposes of care coordination in fear of violating HIPAA. 155 Since
care coordination presumes ready exchange of patient information among
healthcare providers, payers, and third parties involved, HIPAA privacy
provisions can serve to hinder such coordination. Though HIPAA may allow
for such sharing, many covered entities, at least anecdotally, are concerned with
violating HIPAA, resulting in instances where covered entities fail to comply
with requests to share PHI. 156
In fact, in a late 2018 Request for Information (“RFI”), OCR admitted
that a number of covered entities have expressed reluctance to share information
related to care coordination or management of treatment, especially in
situations where multi-disciplinary teams are involved. 157 The purpose of
146. See supra text accompanying notes 73–81.
147. § 164.502(b)(2)(i).
148. See id.
149. Id. § 164.501 (defining healthcare operations).
150. Id. (defining payment).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. (defining healthcare operations).
154. See id. § 164.502(b)(2).
155. OCR May Alter HIPAA Rules To Ease Compliance, Care Coordination, RELIAS MEDIA (Mar. 1,
2019), https://www.reliasmedia.com/articles/144044-ocr-may-alter-hipaa-rules-to-ease-compliancecare-coordination [https://perma.cc/7Y3L-WCC5].
156. Id.
157. See Request for Information on Modifying HIPAA Rules to Improve Coordinated Care, 83
Fed. Reg. 64,302 (proposed Dec. 14, 2018) (to be codified as 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) [hereinafter RFI
Coordinated Care]. OCR solicited comments for how to improve HIPAA to promote information
sharing for treatment and care coordination, promote parental and caregiver involvement in addressing
the opioid crisis and serious mental illness, and account for disclosures by covered entities. Id.
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OCR’s RFI was to solicit public comments to help identify provisions of
HIPAA that impede the “transformation to value-based healthcare” or ones that
“limit or discourage coordinated care . . . without meaningfully contributing” to
privacy and security of an individual’s PHI. 158 One area identified as needing
comment was the promotion of information sharing in the care coordination
context. 159 OCR’s comment period for its RFI closed on February 12, 2019 and
unfortunately has not yet resulted in the necessary regulation change. Instead,
OCR issued a series of guidances, including one directed at care coordination
for health plans. 160
II. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY GUIDANCES
Under the Congressional delegation of rulemaking authority under
HIPAA, HHS is responsible for promulgating regulations consistent with
HIPAA’s purpose and guidelines. 161 As an administrative agency, HHS must
follow the APA 162 in order to add or modify regulations. While much of the
regulatory framework has gone through the APA’s formal procedure, OCR, the
enforcement division of HHS, also issues periodic guidance that is intended to
provide the public with the agency’s interpretation of a particular regulation. 163
OCR’s guidances are aimed toward clarifying the scope of certain HIPAA rules
and delineating what is explicitly permitted. However, many of the guidance
released by OCR are notoriously bare in detailing what is permissible. 164
Additionally, the process for issuing guidance is much less formal than the
process for enacting or amending a regulation, and guidance is not legally
binding in the same way a regulation is. However, many regulated entities,
including those regulated under HIPAA and HHS, treat administrative agency
guidance as binding and are rarely willing to stray from them. Regulated entities
believe that if the agency releases guidance on a particular topic and does not
mention a specific allowance, the agency might not believe the allowance is
legal.

158. Id.
159. Id. In fact, care coordination is the first issue listed in the RFI.
160. See infra Part III.
161. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
162. The Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as 5 U.S.C.
§§ 500–596 (2018)).
163. For a list of OCR guidance, see Office for Civil Rights, HIPAA Guidance Materials, U.S.
DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals
/privacy/guidance/index.html [https://perma.cc/5ZG5-K7V5].
164. See id. For example, many OCR guidances are merely FAQs that clarify specific questions
but do not contemplate similar scenarios outside of the scope of the questions. Id.
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The APA Rulemaking Process

In simple terms, agencies are delegated authority to issue regulations from
laws enacted by Congress. 165 Agencies are not permitted to take action that goes
beyond their statutory authority or violates the Constitution and must follow
the APA through an open public process when issuing regulations. 166 The APA
requires agencies to follow certain administrative procedures when creating
regulations, including publishing notice of both the proposed and final
rulemaking in the Federal Register and providing the public an opportunity to
comment on the proposed rulemaking, colloquially known as notice-andcomment rulemaking. 167
In order to publish a regulatory rule, 168 agencies must go through a very
long and public process. 169 Many times, an agency will survey its area of legal
expertise and decide which issues or goals have priority for rulemaking. 170 Once
an agency feels comfortable with an initial rule, it will publish it as a proposed
rule which starts the notice-and-comment process. 171 The proposed rule will
include a summary of the issues under consideration and invite interested
parties to comment on the proposed rule by a certain date. 172 The default
165. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; Gundy v. United States, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2116,
2123 (stating that under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress may confer discretion to executive
agencies “to implement and enforce the laws”), reh’g denied 140 S. Ct. 579 (2019); see also Yakas v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944) (finding the Constitution does not “deny[] to the Congress
the necessary resources . . . to perform its function[s]”).
166. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2018). Additionally, agencies are required to follow additional procedures
outside of the rulemaking process, including submitting public regulatory plans once a year on a unified
agenda of regulatory and deregulatory actions regarding future rulemaking activities to update the
public on pending and completed regulatory actions. See Exec. Order No. 13,771 § 3(c), 82 Fed. Reg.
9339, 9340 (Jan. 30, 2017).
167. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(d) (2018).
168. Rules are agency statements of “general or particular applicability” to all entities regulated by
the agency and are designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy. Id. § 551(4).
169. I will only be addressing the informal rulemaking procedure under APA § 553 rather than
rulemaking that requires a formal hearing under APA §§ 556, 557. See id. § 553(c) (“When rules are
required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, [APA §§ 556,
557] apply . . . .”). HIPAA does not require a formal hearing procedure in its statute. See Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 707, 110 Stat. 1936, 1951
(codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. § 1911c (2018)) (“The Secretary . . . may promulgate such
regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this part.”). Also, HIPAA
does not have the unmistakable indicia of formality required to trigger a formal hearing. See U.S. v.
Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 238 (1973) (finding that statutes delegating administrative agency
authority need to explicitly state a need for a formality to require a formal hearing).
170. An agency’s motivations for rulemaking include Congress passing new legislation that directs
an agency; external factors, such as technology, scientific data, or accident in the field; required reviews,
lawsuits, petitions, and prompt letters from the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(“OIRA”); and recommendations from other agencies, committees, or groups.
171. § 553(b), (c) (detailing the requirements for public notice and opportunity to participate,
colloquially known as notice-and-comment).
172. Id. Interested parties can provide comments through written data, views or positions,
arguments, and oral presentation in certain circumstances. Id. § 553(c).
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comment period is thirty to sixty days, though this can be longer if the agency
determines an extension is necessary. 173
Based on these public comments, the agency must determine whether its
proposed solution will help accomplish its goals or solve identified problems. 174
It also must consider alternative solutions that may be more effective or cost
less. Before the final rule is issued, the President of the United States, as head
of the executive branch, has an opportunity to review the rule. 175
Once the final rule is approved, the agency must publish it in the Federal
Register. 176 Final rules are then sent to Congress and the Government
Accountability Office (“GAO”), an independent agency that provides auditing,
evaluation, and investigative services for Congress, before they can take
effect. 177
Administrative rulemaking through the APA process is legally binding on
the regulated entities that the agency governs. Because agencies are typically
led by experts in the field that they are regulating, and because agencies must
provide the public an opportunity to provide feedback during the rulemaking
process, administrative rulemaking may be viewed as one of the most
democratic ways to regulate certain industries. 178 Congressional rulemaking, on
the other hand, relies on representative legislators to vote on behalf of their
constituents. Members of the public generally do not have opportunity to
comment on the record during congressional rulemaking proceedings. 179
However, the APA requirements are a “costly, time-consuming set of
procedures.” 180 These procedures include notice and comment in the Federal
Register as well as executive oversight, which often result in a lengthy
rulemaking process. 181 This lack of speed and flexibility can stymie timely
173. Id. § 553(d)(3).
174. Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 1(b), 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011).
175. Id. (reaffirming Exec. Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994)).
176. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (2018).
177. See Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 251, 110 Stat.
847, 868 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 801 (2018)) (providing that agencies must submit rules to Congress
for review).
178. Although the APA requires agencies to provide the public an opportunity to comment on the
issue that will go on the official record (i.e. notice and comment), the APA does not actually require
that agencies follow any public comment in crafting its rule. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2018).
179. Congressional hearings and committee meetings are typically announced publicly with the
date, time, and subject matter to be discussed with the intention of being open to the public to attend.
See generally Standing Rules of the Senate, S. Doc. No. 110-9 (2013), Rule XXVI at 31 (describing
Congressional committee procedure for investigations and hearings). However, the Congressional
rules do not provide the public an opportunity to comment on the proceeding on the record, unless
individuals were already invited or subpoenaed to speak as a witness. See id.
180. Nicholas R. Parillo, Federal Agency Guidance and Power To Bind: An Empirical Study of Agencies
and Industries, 36 YALE J. REG. 165, 168 (2019) [hereinafter Parillo, Power To Bind].
181. Though no comprehensive collection of guidance exists, some have estimated that for a given
agency the page count for guidances can be greater than actual regulations by factors of anywhere
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solutions to pressing issues. As such, many administrative agencies forgo the
APA rulemaking process and instead turn to guidance to provide real-time
interpretation on issues.
B.

Practical Legal Binding Effect of Administrative Agency Guidance

Guidance is a general term used in administrative law to describe
documents created by government agencies intended to explain, interpret, or
advise interested parties about rules, laws, and procedures, clarifying and
influencing how government agencies administer regulations and programs. 182
However, unlike regulations enacted through the APA that officially bind the
agency, guidance does not technically carry the full weight of law. 183 Still,
issuing guidance is a much easier process than APA rulemaking, and agencies
often turn to guidance as a tool to answer questions about the meaning of a
regulation and how to comply with it. 184
Guidances are “ubiquitous and essential feature[s]” of government
agencies and do not require the same stringent and time-consuming process as
administrative regulations do under the APA. 185 The APA defines guidances as
agency statements that qualify as “interpretive rules” or “general statements of
policy,” though neither phrase is defined within the APA. 186 As such, guidances
are supposed to provide an agency’s “current thinking about individual
between twenty and two hundred. Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum:
Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 805 (2001); Peter L. Strauss,
The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1468–69 (1992) (comparing how much space guidance
materials for particular agencies occupied on library shelves to the space occupied by the rules
themselves).
182. See Syncor Int’l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“An interpretive rule . . .
typically reflects an agency’s construction of a statute that has been entrusted to the agency to
administer.”); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(“[Guidance] only announces what the agency seeks to establish as policy.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 30 n.3 (1947)
(explaining the difference between substantive and interpretive rules).
183. However, while not legally binding, administrative agency guidance is entitled Skidmore
deference. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001). Under Skidmore deference, courts
are not entirely deferential to agencies, instead giving deference based on the agency’s care in crafting
guidance, consistency with previous guidance, formality of such guidance, relative expertise, and
persuasiveness of the agency’s position. See id.; Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)
(“The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”).
184. Guidance,
REG.
GROUP,
https://www.regulationwriters.com/regulatory_glossary/
[https://perma.cc/7UQ6-PVYX].
185. Parillo, Power To Bind, supra note 1780, at 180.
186. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2018). Instead, many cite to U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 182,
which defines interpretive rules as “rules or statements issued by an agency to advise the public of the
agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which it administers” and general statements of policy
as “statements issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the manner in which the agency
proposes to exercise a discretionary power.” Id. at 30 n.3.
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adjudicatory or enforcement proceedings” and leave room for case-by-case
discretion. 187 In actuality, many regulated parties face “practical pressure to
follow what a guidance document ‘suggests,’” absent individual exemptions
from the agency, which many agencies are “inflexible” in providing. 188 In fact,
the GAO has determined that certain guidance documents can qualify as rules
under the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”) 189 and the APA. 190 The fear is
that guidance documents provide strong incentives for regulated parties to
comply as if they were binding regulatory rule.
For regulated parties, the incentive to follow guidance is influenced by
four factors compiled by Nicholas R. Parillo (“Parillo factors”): (1) pre-approval
requirements, (2) investment in relationships to agencies, (3) prevalence of
compliance personnel, and (4) high costs for one-off enforcement. 191 The first
factor, pre-approval requirements, contemplates the effect of a regulated party
having to obtain affirmative assent from a government agency in the form of
permits, licenses, or accreditation. 192 For example, the Food and Drug
187. Parillo, Power To Bind, supra note 180, at 168–69.
188. Id. at 174.
189. The CRA empowers Congress and the GAO to review and potentially overrule new federal
regulations by government agencies. Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-121, § 251, 110 Stat. 847, 868 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2018)).
190. In 2017, the GAO determined that two guidance documents regarding lending practices were
legislative rules. See Letter from Susan A. Poling, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, to
Senator Pat Toomey (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/687879.pdf [https://perma.cc
/227B-MV23] (determining that the CRA applied to interagency guidance on leveraged lending);
Letter from Thomas H. Armstrong, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, to Senator Pat
Toomey (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/688763.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WW88WJM] (determining that the CRA applied to a bulletin on indirect auto lending and compliance with
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act).
191. Parillo, Power To Bind, supra note 180, at 177. The methodology in developing these factors
relies upon a series of interviews regarding guidance with a number of individuals involved within
eight distinct regulatory areas, including agency officials, industry attorneys, corporate executives, and
representatives for nongovernmental organizations. Id. at 173–74. Parillo’s empirical study included
interviews with representatives from the following administrative agencies: the FDA, Environmental
Protection Agency, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Department of Energy, U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Federal Aviation Administration, banking regulatory agencies, and HHS.
Id. Parillo’s analysis of HHS guidance is limited to Medicare reimbursement under the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services program. Id. at 190. Since this Comment focuses on HHS and its role
in promulgating HIPAA regulations, Parillo’s analysis regarding HHS Medicare guidance is not quite
on point; thus, I chose not to discuss it in this Comment. Parillo’s use of highly diverse individuals
from a myriad of regulatory agencies in the development of the Parillo factors hones its effectiveness
in trans-substantive application. Trans-substantivity refers to the doctrine that certain rules or
application do not vary between substantive contexts and thus can be applied effectively in any of those
contexts. See David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law, 2013 BYU L. REV.
1191, 1191 (2013). While the empirical study is not wholly comprehensive, it includes a subset of agency
examples that are representative of much of the administrative agency state at large, encompassing
agencies that regulate healthcare, the environment, workplace, science and technology, and banking
and finance.
192. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—
Should Federal Agencies Use Them To Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1340 (1992) (explaining that
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Administration (“FDA”) mandates that drugs and medical devices be approved
as safe and effective before a company can market them. Companies will
generally follow this guidance without exception since the FDA’s approval
decisions are discretionary and “represent[] the FDA’s latest thinking on the
matter.” 193 Noncompliance with the FDA’s pre-approval guidance would be a
“folly” and potentially waste significant investment in protocol and
marketing. 194
The second factor provides incentive to comply if there is a need to
maintain a good relationship with the agency. This can occur in situations where
an agency continuously monitors a regulated party and that party needs to
interact with the agency under a complex regulatory scheme. These conditions
behoove a regulated party to win the trust of the agency to receive favorable
treatment in case of future noncompliant conduct. 195 With the FDA, many
companies seek to establish good relations since they must repeatedly seek
approvals under the FDA’s complex reporting requirements. 196 Having a good
relationship can smooth over noncompliance, especially when a company is
subject to a series of pre-approval requirements. Following guidance can allow
the regulated party to show that it is “not seeking to push the edge of the law”
but is deferential to the agency’s suggested conduct. 197
The third factor refers to the rise of compliance personnel within regulated
entities and their effect on improving compliance with agency guidance. These
“compliance officers” have backgrounds, socialization, and career incentives that
provide them with strong incentives to maintain good relations with agencies
by following guidance. 198 In the FDA context, many compliance officers are the
interface between companies and the agency and seek to understand the
agency’s expectations, disseminate the information within the companies, and
ensure their compliance. 199 Thus, the existence of compliance officers creates a
culture of compliance within regulated companies.

pre-approval requirements have significant influence on applicants because failure to comply can result
in significant penalties).
193. Parillo, Power To Bind, supra note 180, at 186.
194. Id. (quoting Interview with Source 24, Official, Fed. Trade Ass’n). Parillo’s research
methodology involved interviewing individuals within different regulated agencies to discern common
attitudes towards agency guidance.
195. Stronger relationships can lead to agencies interpreting noncompliant conduct as less
deserving of penalties, e.g. accidental actions as opposed to deliberate ones. See generally Winston
Harrington, Enforcement Leverage When Penalties Are Restricted, 37 J. PUB. ECON. 29 (1988) (detailing
a dynamic repeated-game model that explains the actions and inactions of regulated entities and
enforcement agencies).
196. Parillo, Power To Bind, supra note 180, at 192.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 200–01.
199. DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 644–46 (2010).
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Finally, a regulated entity has incentives to follow agency guidance in
order to reduce the risk of sanctions in a one-off enforcement proceeding against
the particular entity. Because guidance outlines what an agency considers to be
lawful or announces what conduct an agency will or will not allow, a regulated
party could significantly reduce enforcement risk by following such guidance to
the letter. However, in reality, regulated entities base their compliance strategy
on a risk calculation that looks at the probability of the agency detecting
noncompliance, finding a violation, and imposing sanctions. 200 If the potential
cost for noncompliance is low, an entity might not push as hard to follow agency
guidance to the letter and may choose not to request clarification from the
agency on particular issues.
C.

Binding Effect of OCR Guidance Generally

Many covered entities treat OCR guidance on HIPAA compliance as
binding for three reasons: (1) knowledge of HIPAA’s public, complaint-driven
enforcement system; (2) fear of violating HIPAA due to costly penalties; and
(3) a desire to promote public confidence in protection of patient PHI. As such,
many hospital systems employ several compliance personnel and pay for
consulting services 201 to ensure HIPAA compliance. Additionally, OCR’s
guidances are binding in practical effect for institutional reasons, as supported
by the Parillo factors that demonstrate why regulated entities are incentivized
to follow guidance. 202
First, covered entities treat OCR guidance as binding due to the
complaint-driven enforcement system and the public nature of OCR
investigations and findings of noncompliance. 203 OCR enforces HIPAA rules
by investigating complaints filed directly with OCR; conducting reviews to
200. Parillo, Power To Bind, supra note 180 at 208 (explaining factors involved when FDA-regulated
companies calculate compliance risks).
201. A quick Google search reveals a bevy of HIPAA compliance consulting firms. See, e.g., HIPAA
Compliance Checklist, HIPAA J., https://www.hipaajournal.com/hipaa-compliance-checklist/ [https://
perma.cc/2XXR-7KYK]; How to Become HIPAA Compliant, COMPLIANCY GROUP, https://compliancy
-group.com/how-to-become-hipaa-compliant/ [https://perma.cc/2878-K558]; Health Care Compliance
and Regulatory Services, STRATEGIC MGMT., https://compliance.com/services/ [https://perma.cc
/AV2N-653C]; HIPAA and HITECH Health Care Compliance Consulting, RSM, https://rsmus.com
/what-we-do/industries/health-care/hipaa-hitech-compliance-consulting.html#
[https://perma.cc
/K4G5-SG54]. Additionally, many companies develop electronic health record (“EHR”) software to
comply with HIPAA technical requirements. See, e.g., Allscripts Security Program, ALLSCRIPTS,
https://www.allscripts.com/legal/security-program/ [https://perma.cc/JD2S-VQQG]; Cerner Security
Program, CERNER, https://www.cerner.com/security [https://perma.cc/65YS-7RG2]; Government
Regulations, EPIC, https://www.epic.com/software#GovernmentRegulations [https://perma.cc/26JJVW5A].
202. See supra Section II.B (detailing how the Parillo factors influence an agency’s likelihood to
follow guidance).
203. For a list of cases currently under investigation by OCR, see Office for Civil Rights, supra
note 47.
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determine if covered entities are in compliance; and engaging in education and
outreach to foster compliance with HIPAA requirements. 204 Complaints are
often initiated by third parties through OCR’s online, public portal. 205 If the
complaint describes an action over which OCR has jurisdiction, 206 OCR will
contact the involved parties, determine if an investigation is necessary, and
possibly even refer the complaint to the DOJ when there is a violation of a
criminal provision of HIPAA. 207 OCR also performs compliance reviews on its
own initiative to investigate problems that may be particularly acute, national
in scope, or newly emerging. 208
If OCR determines that an investigation is necessary and later finds that
the covered entity was not in compliance, OCR will resolve the case by
obtaining voluntary compliance, corrective action, and/or a resolution
agreement. 209 Additionally, OCR can provide technical assistance prior to or
after an investigation to ensure compliance. 210
For resolution agreements, covered entities enter into a settlement
agreement with HHS where the covered entity or business associate agrees to
meet certain obligations and make reports to HHS. 211 During this time, HHS
monitors compliance with the obligations set out in the agreement. 212 If the
covered entity does not take corrective action or otherwise resolve the violation
204. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.306–312, 164 (2019); see also Office for Civil Rights, Enforcement Process,
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (June 7, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals
/compliance-enforcement/enforcement-process/index.html [https://perma.cc/J5C3-9VP6] (outlining
the enforcement process).
205. Office for Civil Rights, Complaint Portal, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://ocrportal.hhs.gov/ocr/cp/complaint_frontpage.jsf;jsessionid=BFFCDC8DFF0CABBAF5417
CCD6411CE25 [https://perma.cc/D9PW-T4F7].
206. The alleged action must have taken place after the HIPAA rules took effect and the complaint
itself must have been filed against a covered entity or business associate within 180 days and allege an
activity that would violate HIPAA rules. Office for Civil Rights, What OCR Considers During Intake
and Review, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (June 7, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/compliance-enforcement/examples/what-ocr-considers-during-intake-and-review
/index.html [https://perma.cc/3UNE-757G]; see § 160.306 (describing the complaint procedure).
207. 42 C.F.R. § 1320d-6 (2019).
208. See, e.g., Office for Civil Rights, Recent Civil Rights Resolution Agreements & Compliance Reviews,
U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/forproviders/compliance-enforcement/agreements/index.html [https://perma.cc/4XAK-EEA7] (listing
previous compliance review initiatives for HIV/AIDS and language access in critical access hospitals).
209. 45 C.F.R. § 160.312 (2019).
210. OCR only offers or requires technical assistance after a complaint has been through the initial
intake and review process. For breach compliance review, OCR only offers technical assistance postinvestigation. See Office for Civil Rights, Enforcement Data, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
(Mar.
22, 2019),
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-enforcement/data
/index.html [https://perma.cc/SGS8-NV9F].
211. Generally, this period is three years. Office for Civil Rights, Resolution Agreements, U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/complianceenforcement/agreements/index.html [https://perma.cc/CS5G-AT8C].
212. Id.
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satisfactorily, OCR may impose CMPs. 213 CMPs are imposed in tiers based on
the culpability associated with each violation and failure to correct said
violation. 214 As such, CMPs can quickly add up.
The high cost of CMPs hits at the heart of the second reason why entities
treat OCR guidance as binding: fear of violating HIPAA and the high costs
associated with such a violation. Additionally, CMPs implicate the fourth
Parillo factor—high costs of one-off enforcement. In 2018, OCR obtained
settlements and CMPs in ten cases for a total of $28 million, corresponding to
an average of $2.8 million and median of $500,000 per fine. 215 That being said,
these ten cases where monetary penalties were obtained represent merely a
fraction of total cases that OCR processed 216 and investigated, 217 corresponding
to 0.0305% of total cases and 0.62% of cases investigated. 218 OCR’s
investigational framework is highly dependent on the submission of public
complaints, although some reviews are initiated by OCR. As such, the risk that
OCR both detects noncompliance and initiates an investigation could
potentially be very low. Even if OCR were to receive a complaint, there is a
chance that it will not fine the covered entity and might even provide technical
assistance to help the entity become compliant. This all factors into a covered
entity’s risk calculation and its incentive for complying with OCR guidance.
The risk calculation of HIPAA-regulated entities is in line with the reasoning
behind the fourth Parillo factor in that the regulated entity does not look solely
at the high cost of one-off enforcement proceedings, but instead looks at a
variety of factors in a risk-benefit analysis. Depending on the size of a covered
entity, the complexity of its system, and potential risk, the cost of one-off
enforcement can vary significantly. 219
213. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.402(a) (2019) (“[T]he [HHS] Secretary will impose a civil money penalty
. . . if the Secretary determines that the covered entity or business associate has violated an
administrative simplification provision.”).
214. Id. § 160.404(b)(2) (detailing that the civil money penalty ranges from $100 to $50,000 for
each violation made without knowledge, $1000 to $50,000 for each violation due to reasonable cause
but not willful neglect, $10,000 to $50,000 for each violation made with willful neglect and corrected
within 30 days, and $50,000 or more for each violation made with willful neglect and not corrected
within the 30-day grace period). Additionally, each tier has a cap of $1.5 million for identical violations
during a calendar year. Id.
215. See Office of Civil Rights, supra note 211 (listing all publications regarding resolution
agreements and settlements from 2008 through 2019).
216. In 2018, OCR received 25,089 complaints, initiated 438 compliance reviews, and provided
technical assistance in 7243 cases for a total of 32,770 cases. Office for Civil Rights, Compliance
Enforcement, Enforcement Results by Year, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 30, 2020),
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-enforcement/data/enforcement-results-byyear/index.html [https://perma.cc/D2S8-HU6C].
217. Of the 32,770 total cases in 2018, OCR investigated 1610. Id.
218. Id.
219. For example, larger hospital systems will likely have a stronger incentive to become HIPAA
compliant based on the number of PHI uses and disclosures in addition to their interconnectivity with
third-party medical and nonmedical organizations.
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However, determining if the covered entity is HIPAA compliant is a
complex process. As previously mentioned, the HIPAA Privacy and Security
Rules provide a series of administrative, technical, and physical safeguards for
covered entities and business associates to follow. However, HIPAA
intentionally leaves many of these requirements vague. Additionally, OCR does
not respond to individual requests for compliance auditing. Without
affirmation from OCR, it is impossible to proactively determine whether a
covered entity is HIPAA-compliant. Instead, covered entities may not learn of
their noncompliance until OCR investigates and places the covered entity on
the “Wall of Shame.” 220
Thankfully, the HIPAA regulatory structure does provide a self-contained
way for covered entities to monitor compliance. HIPAA requires that covered
entities and business associates designate a “security official” and “privacy
official” responsible for the “development and implementation of the policies
and procedures required” by HIPAA. 221 This responsibility generally includes
adopting appropriate policies and procedures to comply with HIPAA, updating
those policies and procedures, overseeing and monitoring those policies and
procedures, sending out notices of privacy practices to individuals, collecting
business associate agreements and updating as necessary, coordinating training
for employees who handle PHI, and handling complaints of alleged
noncompliance with HIPAA. 222 While the responsibilities for both the privacy
and security official can be fulfilled by one person, 223 more complex and larger
covered entities will require more compliance personnel and even rely on thirdparty services. Additionally, covered entities must designate a contact person
or office responsible for receiving OCR noncompliance complaints and
communicating with OCR during their investigations. 224
The HIPAA requirements for having security and privacy officers as well
as designated contact persons implicate the second and third Parillo factors—
investment in relationships with OCR and prevalence of compliance personnel.
Given that the penalty structure is based on culpability level, working closely
with OCR might help to reduce the amount that OCR ultimately fines an
entity. The covered entity may even avoid a fine altogether through voluntary
compliance. Privacy and security officials can help implement necessary
changes through required voluntary compliance or OCR’s technical assistance.
As such, covered entities and business associates have a strong incentive to

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

See What Is The HIPAA Wall of Shame?, supra note 47.
45 C.F.R. §§ 164.308(a)(2), 164.530(a)(1)(i) (2019).
See generally id. §§ 164.308, 164.530 (listing required responsibilities for officials).
See id. §§ 164.308(a)(2), 164.530(a)(1)(i).
Id. § 164.530(a)(1)(ii).
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develop and maintain strong relationships with OCR when faced with a
complaint or review. 225
Finally, covered entities also treat OCR guidance as binding due to public
sentiment and concern regarding privacy, which in turn creates a stronger
culture of HIPAA compliance. 226 HHS has even acknowledged this reluctance
to share patient PHI in fear of violating HIPAA. 227
Patient confidence that covered entities will ensure the privacy, security,
and integrity of their individual health information can affect whether patients
choose to go with a certain hospital system. Because HIPAA is necessarily
linked to patient privacy, building a long-term patient relationship requires
more than just HIPAA compliance; it necessitates a deep commitment by the
covered entity to keep PHI safe and private. In 2017, 28% of all data breaches
occurred amongst healthcare organizations. 228 Of those breaches, human error
was a major contributor: 35% were the result of accidental mishandling of
PHI. 229 As mentioned previously, any investigation OCR handles is posted on

225. For example, in July 2017, the Mayo Clinic—the premiere not-for profit academic medical
center focused on integrated clinical practice, education, and research—went live with its $1.5 billion
investment in a new HIPAA-compliant EHR system. Mike Miliard, Mayo Clinic Completes Epic EHR
Rollout with Final Go-Lives, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Oct. 9, 2018, 11:51 AM),
https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/mayo-clinic-completes-epic-ehr-rollout-final-go-lives
[https://perma.cc/H9GC-QYGJ]. Mayo employs over 65,000 people, including more than 4800
physicians and scientists and over 100 information technology compliance personnel. MAYO CLINIC,
AN INSIDE LOOK AT MAYO CLINIC 3 (2019), https://mcforms.mayo.edu/mc7300-mc7399
/mc7360.pdf?_ga=2.28162876.1838852818.1578354340-1276621027.1578354340
[https://perma.cc
/CS3Z-ZD4M]; Information Security Careers, MAYO CLINIC, https://jobs.mayoclinic.org/careerprofiles/nonSmedical-professionals/information-security/ [https://perma.cc/Y5KE-M8NN]. Mayo has
a very complex and large health system, and the number of compliance personnel and the amount spent
on its third-party EHR system is indicative of its desire to avoid noncompliance.
226. See Does HIPAA Help or Hinder Patient Care and Public Safety?: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
On Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 113th Cong. 116 (2013) (statement
of Tim Murphy, U.S. House of Representatives) (stating that physicians and nurses choose to disclose
less PHI for fear of penalties associated with violating HIPAA); Bryan K. Touchet, Stephanie R.
Drummond & William R. Yates, The Impact of Fear of HIPAA Violation on Patient Care, 55
PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 575, 575–76 (2004) (concluding that concerns about violating HIPAA leads to
covered entities being “less willing to disclose [PHI]”); Ruth Penafiel, Nurses’ HIPAA Phobia Does Exist:
How To Address Its Hindrance to EHR Success (Part 1), HEALTHCARE GUYS (July 29, 2015),
https://www.healthcareguys.com/2015/07/29/nurses-hipaa-phobia-does-exist-how-to-address-itshindrance-to-ehr-success-part-i/ [https://perma.cc/9JBR-RDT3] (describing HIPAA phobia—the fear
of violating HIPAA—and how it hinders EHR adoption and sharing PHI).
227. See RFI Coordinated Care, supra note 157, at 64,303 (“[S]ome HIPAA-covered entities have
expressed reluctance to share this information for fear of violating HIPAA.”). Given that HHS did
not identify what entities had voiced their concerns, these comments were likely made in a nonpublic
manner.
228. See VERIZON, 2018 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 4 (2018),
https://enterprise.verizon.com/resources/reports/DBIR_2018_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/43GBMCU2] (reporting 536 healthcare breaches out of a total of 1906 breaches across all industries).
229. See id. at 5.
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the proverbial “Wall of Shame,” 230 where anyone can view the covered entity
or business associate involved, the number of individuals affected, and the type
and location of breach. 231 The public nature of this information can factor into
whether a patient chooses to go with a certain hospital system and how they
perceive overall patient care quality. 232 Healthcare organizations share this same
view—damage to patient trust is costly to the healthcare organization’s
reputation and bottom line. 233 Both patients and healthcare organizations
recognize that without strong PHI privacy protections, patients feel less
comfortable and are less likely to remain long-term patients. Due to this patient
sentiment, avoiding HIPAA violations is a high priority to healthcare covered
entities.
In analyzing the three main reasons for compliance with OCR guidance,
most of the Parillo factors are implicated. The only factor that is not implicated
is the first factor: pre-approval requirements from the regulating agency. Preapproval requirements do not actually exist within the HIPAA regulatory
framework since OCR does not perform any preemptive compliance reviews
prior to investigation of a public complaint. The remaining three factors—
investment in relationships to agencies, prevalence of compliance personnel,
and high costs for one-off enforcement—weigh heavily in favor of OCR
guidance being practically binding for larger and more complex covered
entities.
HIPAA mandates that covered entities have security and privacy officials
as the point people in case of an OCR investigation. For larger and more
complex covered entities such as hospital systems (which are often responsible
for individual healthcare provider, billing, and insurance teams), having
dedicated compliance personnel is essential to ensuring compliance with
HIPAA regulations. Given that CMPs imposed by OCR vary according to
culpability level and response time, maintaining strong relationships with OCR
is absolutely necessary to avoid the high costs of CMPs and being posted on
OCR’s “Wall of Shame.” 234 All of the applicable Parillo factors support the
conclusion that OCR guidance is binding in practical effect.

230. See What Is The HIPAA Wall of Shame?, supra note 47.
231. Office for Civil Rights, supra note 47 (detailing cases currently under investigation for all
breaches reported within the last 24 months).
232. See Victoria Kisekka & Justin Scott Giboney, The Effectiveness of Health Care Information
Technologies: Evaluation of Trust, Security Beliefs, and Privacy as Determinants of Health Care Outcomes, 20
J. MED. INTERNET RES. 107, 113–14 (2018) (finding that trust in health information and belief in
effectiveness of information security safeguards increases patient perceptions of healthcare quality).
233. FORRESTER CONSULTING, TAKE A DATA-CENTRIC APPROACH TO DATA PROTECTION
AND PRIVACY (January 2019) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
234. See What Is The HIPAA Wall of Shame?, supra note 47.
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III. OCR’S GUIDANCE ON CARE COORDINATION
As mentioned previously, 235 OCR solicited public feedback to improve
HIPAA provisions related to care coordination. OCR specifically mentioned
its desire to ensure that HIPAA does not “limit or discourage coordinated
care.” 236 Although OCR received numerous comments from various healthcare
organizations on how to improve HIPAA to clarify care coordination, HHS has
yet to make any formal regulation changes. Instead of clarifying care
coordination as a whole, OCR published guidance for one specific scenario:
sharing PHI between health plans for care coordination purposes. 237 The scant
OCR guidance does not clarify whether HIPAA explicitly permits sharing PHI
in other scenarios, which leaves covered entities uncertain as to whether sharing
PHI for care coordination purposes will constitute a HIPAA violation. Instead,
covered entities will need to go through a timely process of obtaining the
patient’s express authorization or drafting business associate agreements, which
is, of course, valuable time that could be spent treating patients.
A.

OCR’s Guidance on Care Coordination

In June 2019, OCR issued guidance regarding how PHI can be shared
between health plans to support care coordination and continuity of care (the
“guidance”). 238 The guidance confirmed that HIPAA allows PHI to be used and
disclosed for healthcare operations as related to a second health plan for care
coordination purposes. 239 Such disclosures must meet the conditions for
permitted healthcare operations disclosures: both entities have or had a
relationship with the individual, the disclosure pertains to that relationship, and
the healthcare operation is permitted by HIPAA. 240 Since care coordination is
included in permitted healthcare operations, disclosures for care coordination
purposes are probably permissible without patient authorization. 241 However,
such disclosures are still subject to the minimum necessary principle. 242 As a
reminder, this means that if covered entities perform activities that qualify
under the healthcare operations category of TPO, those entities can use or
disclose only the minimum amount of PHI to achieve their intended purpose
235. See supra notes 157–60 and accompanying text (describing the Request For Information
process).
236. RFI Coordinated Care, supra note 157, at 64,302.
237. Office for Civil Rights, HIPAA and Health Plans - Uses and Disclosures for Care Coordination
and Continuity of Care, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (June 26, 2019), https://www.hhs.gov
/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/3014/uses-and-disclosures-for-care-coordination-and-continuity-of-care
/index.html [https://perma.cc/2LQN-8NCP].
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(a)(1)(i), 164.506(c)(4) (2019).
241. Office for Civil Rights, supra note 237.
242. Id.
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and no more. 243 Any other PHI that could conceivably have a potential benefit
for a patient could be necessarily excluded under the minimum necessary
principle. Because care coordination requires a holistic understanding of the
patient’s entire health background, restricting the amount of shared PHI, as
required by the minimum necessary principle, reduces the efficacy of care
coordination efforts.
The guidance goes on to state that HIPAA permits a health plan that
receives PHI from another covered entity to use and disclose that PHI in order
to inform individuals about other available health plans it offers without first
obtaining the individual’s authorization in limited situations. 244 The guidance
specifically mentions that typically, disclosure for this purpose would be
considered marketing and would not be permitted without prior authorization
from the individual. 245 The marketing exception does not implicate care
coordination and yet is included in the same guidance, which further
emphasizes just how scant the guidance is in clarifying care coordination under
HIPAA.
B.

Effect on Care Coordination for HIPAA-Covered Entities

In effect, the guidance is limited in scope to allow sharing PHI between
health plans, so long as that sharing does not fall within one of two marketing
exceptions. 246 While it might be fair to assume that the other exceptions to the
marketing definition are also applicable to sharing between health plans, OCR
did not specifically mention these exclusions in its guidance. Without explicit
243. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.402(b), 164.514(d) (2019); see also Office for Civil Rights, supra note 74.
244. Office for Civil Rights, supra note 237.
245. Id. Marketing is defined as “communication about a product or service that encourages
recipients of the communication to purchase or use the product or service.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2019).
The marketing rule provided in HIPAA Section 164.508 includes a few exceptions. Exclusions to the
marketing rule include face-to-face communication by the covered entity and promotional gifts of
nominal value by the covered entity. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(3)(i) (2019). Additionally, the definition
of marketing in Section 164.501 carves out other exceptions. See Office for Civil Rights, supra note 237
(explaining how the definition of marketing in § 164.501 does not include communication about
products or services). OCR’s guidance includes both exceptions to the marketing rule but only one
from the marketing definition applying to health plan availability. Id. The guidance FAQ states that
communications regarding “replacements to, or enhancements of, existing health plans” are an
exception to the definition of marketing, so long as the covered entity “is not receiving financial
renumeration for the communications.” Id. Thus, a covered entity may disclose PHI that has been
received for another purpose so long as the above conditions—the PHI is used to communicate with
patients about health plan replacements and the communicating covered entity is not receiving
payment—are met. Id. OCR’s guidance FAQ does not mention several additional exceptions that are
mentioned in HIPAA’s definition for marketing, including one that explicitly allows for sharing if it is
for “care coordination . . . and related functions” that do not fall within the treatment definition.
Compare id., with § 164.501. For HIPAA’s definition of treatment, see supra note 82 and accompanying
text. Again, this exception is only provided if the covered entity is not receiving financial renumeration
in exchange for the communication. § 164.501.
246. See supra note 245 for discussion of marketing exceptions.
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allowance, it is unclear whether OCR considers these actions as exclusions to
marketing and thus permitted without express authorization, or if these actions
are not exclusions.
Additionally, the guidance only contemplates situations where either both
health plans are covered entities or there is at least a business associate
agreement and relationship between the entities sharing PHI. 247 While the
purpose of this is to ensure that individuals will not miss opportunities for
continued health coverage with a different health plan, there are still many gaps
regarding whether authorization is required in other situations involving care
coordination. Since both entities must be covered entities (or at least business
associates) with a relationship to the individual, the guidance does not consider
whether a covered entity can share PHI with a nonmedical third party for care
coordination purposes. As mentioned previously,248 sharing information about
patients to determine eligibility for third-party social services can be imperative
for providing continuity of care for medically indigent people. The requirement
for a previous relationship with the individual and some sort of covered status,
whether as a covered entity or business associate, can significantly slow down
the delivery of required medical care and even deter some patients and their
families from seeking care. Without further guidance from OCR or HHS for
all forms of care coordination, providers can be liable for sharing PHI without
authorization. More importantly, many patients will fall through the cracks
without receiving timely medical care.
For illustrative purposes, I will use the previous example with our diabetic
patient. 249 In order to help manage the patient’s diabetes, her primary care
physician, a covered entity, wants to coordinate with a community-based
diabetes support group right in the patient’s neighborhood. 250 The support
group is not any sort of healthcare provider or other covered entity, nor is it a
business associate since it has not worked with a covered entity before. Under
the current HIPAA rules, her physician will not be able to share the patient’s
PHI with the support group for care coordination purposes without the
patient’s express authorization. Thus, the provider would need to contact the
patient to have her sign an authorization document specifically detailing what
PHI will be shared and who is receiving it. This can become quite cumbersome
for both the provider and the patient, wasting time and demoralizing both

247. See Office for Civil Rights, supra note 237.
248. See supra Section I.B.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 108–15.
250. In this scenario, the support group helps to ensure that patients stick with their diabetes health
plan of restricted diet, increased exercise, and frequent check-ins with the provider. Support groups for
chronic diseases, including diabetes, have been shown to improve healthcare outcomes. See Jina Huh
& Mark S. Ackerman, Collaborative Help in Chronic Disease Management: Supporting Individualized
Problems, COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK, Feb. 2012 at 853.
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parties such that these connections are often not made even though they can be
quite useful for continuous management of chronic conditions.
For an indigent patient in the same exact scenario, this could be even
worse. Reduced or free community-based services may indeed cater to
medically indigent patients but covered entities likely cannot share a patient’s
qualifications with those programs. In other words, the indigent patient may
have theoretical access to a plethora of services to help manage their chronic
disease but will never know of them because of HIPAA’s restrictions on care
coordination. Due to the expensive cost of medications and healthy food, the
medically indigent patient cannot improve her diabetic condition and continues
to languish with dangerous health outcomes.
The OCR guidance does not address situations like these at all since there
is still an inherent requirement that sharing PHI for care coordination purposes
can only be done by covered entities or business associates. While this would
not be an issue if the third-party service already has a previous relationship with
the patient and is a business associate of the covered entity (which must be
memorialized in a business associate agreement), drafting such an agreement
between every single party involved in care coordination is voluminous work
that is typically done on an ad hoc basis.
IV. HIPAA NEEDS TO REDEFINE CARE COORDINATION IN PROPER
SCOPE
Modification of the HIPAA Privacy Rule would best facilitate exchanges
of information and support care coordination. The most feasible solution is
through regulatory change as opposed to OCR guidance. OCR guidance is
limited because it cannot establish standards for social service agencies and
community-based programs that are separate from the existing entities covered
by HIPAA. Under the existing framework, these third parties can only operate
as business associates, which requires business associate agreements or express
authorization from the individual—both of which hamper the care coordination
model due to their administrative costs. As such, regulatory change, rather than
after-the-fact remedies, can most effectively improve care coordination under
HIPAA.
Nonetheless, there are some downsides to regulatory change through the
APA—namely, that it is time consuming and subject to approval by both the
Executive Branch and Congress. Additionally, the APA mandates a minimum
30-day comment period for public input on updates. Despite this, regulatory
change remains the most viable path forward to improve care coordination
under HIPAA given the ineffectiveness of OCR guidance and the confusion
that would inevitably result.
The alternative to regulatory change would involve rewriting the HIPAA
statutes themselves. Certainly, this pathway through Congress would provide
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more democratic accountability as House and Senate members must balance
their constituents’ interests. Additionally, Congress, due to its wide-ranging
expertise, might also be better at looking at the bigger picture and crafting law
that fits within the broader scope of the American legal system.
However, the efficiency of administrative agencies outweighs potential
benefits from the congressional legislative process. Congressional rulemaking is
limited due to its broad scope in that any legislation will reflect value tradeoffs
between each individual legislator’s political party, constituency represented,
and special interest groups, creating milder and less effective laws or even a
complete standstill. 251 In a similar vein, the bicameral nature of Congress often
results in milder laws in order to successfully pass at the House of
Representatives, Senate, and Executive stages. 252
Instead, HHS is better equipped to create a regulation that properly
frames the care coordination issue. First and foremost, HHS consists of
specialists in healthcare who can provide smarter, more practical rules for
covered entities involved in care coordination. And while it is not an elected
body, HHS is not wholly without oversight; it must engage with the public
during the decisionmaking process and receive significant input before crafting
any regulations. 253 Thus, regulatory change by HHS is the best option going
forward to achieve effective, comprehensive medical care that utilizes care
coordination.
A.

Express Provision To Allow Disclosure to Nonmedical Third-party Agencies for
Care Coordination Purposes

The most effective way to facilitate a comprehensive care coordination
model is for HHS to create a HIPAA regulatory permission that explicitly
permits covered entities and related business associates to use and disclose PHI

251. See generally THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT
LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS
OF EXTREMISM (2012) (attributing Congressional ineffectiveness to a vehemently adversarial system
and outliers on the political spectrum caused by factors such as political donors, party ideals and
pressure, and angry constituents); Kathy Canfield-Davis et al., Factors of Influence on Legislative Decision
Making: A Descriptive Study- Updated August 2009, 13 J. LEGAL ETHICAL & REG. ISSUES 55, 56 (2010)
(identifying factors that shape legislative decisionmaking as perceived by lawmakers); Geoffrey C.
Layman, Thomas M. Carsey & Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Party Polarization in American Politics:
Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences, 9 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 83, 83–97 (2006) (analyzing the causes
for partisan polarization across major issues).
252. See generally William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO.
L.J. 523 (1992) (explaining through game theory how regardless of where a bill starts on the political
spectrum, the version signed into law will inevitably be milder than originally envisioned due to the
congressional bicameral process and administrative agencies effectuating legislation).
253. Administrative agencies, however, are not required to consider comments by regulated
entities in their rulemaking; they merely need to provide notice of and an opportunity to comment on
proposed rules. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018).
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to social service agencies and community-based support programs. Effective
treatment, especially for low-resource individuals and the medically indigent,
requires utilizing all facets of medical care clinical services in combination with
social services. Many clinical interventions are much less effective or even
ineffective unless pursued in coordination with social service agencies, which
can assist in finding appropriate health and housing services, consistent sources
of healthy food, support groups, or protective services—resources not typically
offered or available by traditional covered entities and related business
associates.
Many of these supporting agencies are considered noncovered entities
under the current HIPAA Privacy Rule, meaning that individuals need to
provide express authorization so that covered entities may share PHI with these
third parties. 254 To ensure the security of PHI for these noncovered entities,
HIPAA should be modified to create a semicovered entity that is subject to
aspects of HIPAA requirements by virtue of either participating in or providing
care coordination services that require sharing of PHI. Creating a separate
category for care coordination entities would allow HHS and OCR to regulate
these supporting agencies, create separate privacy standards tailored to their
needs and purposes, and ease provider hesitance in sharing PHI with a
noncovered entity.
A new “care coordination associate” entity would require several
provisional changes to the definition, safeguards, and use and disclosure
provisions of HIPAA. 255 First, the care coordination associate definition would
need to encompass all potential entities for all purposes; thus, it needs to be
appropriately broad and tied to the definition of care coordination, which also
needs to be defined in the definition section. 256 Until now, care coordination
has been defined numerous ways by a variety of sources. 257 One suggestion is to
use the one provided by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(“AHRQ”): “deliberately organizing patient care activities and sharing
information among all the participants involved with a patient’s care.” 258
Secondly, the care coordination associate will need to have the appropriate
organizational safeguards to ensure compliance with HIPAA’s standards for
privacy protection. 259 Given the limited scope of services that care coordination
associates provide, it seems unnecessary to have the same stringent safeguard

254. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508 (2019).
255. There will likely be other areas of HIPAA that HHS will need to update to accommodate a
care coordination associate entity, such as breach notification. However, this Comment will not address
them.
256. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2019).
257. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text.
258. Care Coordination, supra note 5.
259. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164.102–106, 164.302–318 (2019).
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restrictions as a covered entity or business associate. But some safeguards should
still be made by balancing the cost and feasibility of implementation against the
calculated risk of breach or lack of privacy. Such a balancing test is not
unprecedented. HIPAA already provides specifications based on a flexible
approach where covered entities “may use any security measures . . . to
reasonably and appropriately implement the standards and implementation
specifications” of the Privacy Rule. 260 This approach looks at factors such as the
size, complexity, and capabilities of the entity; the entity’s technical
infrastructure, hardware, and software security capabilities; cost of security
measures; and probability and criticality of potential risks to privacy. 261 Given
the flexibility of the approach, this provision probably does not need significant
change for the care coordination associate. Nonetheless, this approach does not
provide clear standards and it would be valuable for OCR to provide some
guidance on what appropriate specifications would look like for a care
coordination associate. 262
Finally, there needs to be an explicit care coordination provision added to
the general rules for uses and disclosures of PHI. 263 Because care coordination
associates will not fall squarely in another covered entity or business associate
category, they will need to have specific rules for their use and disclosure of
PHI. These rules should have a wide berth for a care coordination associate to
receive and use PHI for care coordination and population-based health
activities. On the other hand, the rules regarding disclosure of PHI should be
flexible to accommodate for the different roles that care coordination associates
can have. If the care coordination associate is a support or social service agency,
HIPAA’s allowance for disclosure should be minimal. Since these services are
typically at the fringes of the care coordination model (the final entity to which
a patient is referred and services are rendered), they do not need to further refer
patients to organizations outside of the existing model; rather, they will likely
only need to disclose updated PHI within the care coordination model. For
example, a food delivery service will not need to refer the patient to another
organization, but will need to provide updates, such as frequency and content
of service, to parties already in the patient’s care coordination model. While
many of the third parties described above do not need all PHI aggregated for a
patient, 264 it would be foolish and short-sighted to conclude that these scenarios
are exhaustive. There may be scenarios where a care coordination associate can
260. Id. § 164.306(b).
261. Id. § 164.306(b)(2)(i)–(iv).
262. Incidentally, this is one of the intended purposes for administrative guidance: stating what is
or is not viable under the corresponding federal regulations.
263. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2019).
264. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 129–134. For example, meal delivery services likely
only need a patient’s name, phone number, address, and dietary needs, while a patient’s previous phone
numbers or addresses are probably not necessary.
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better tailor their service to handle a patient’s chronic condition using patient
preferences and family history; in these instances, the rules should allow for
disclosure of PHI for such purposes.
Additionally, because care coordination associates are service providers
assisting patients in care management rather than providers of more direct
treatment, HIPAA should not allow disclosures for other activities such as sale
of PHI or other marketing uses. However, as discussed above, HIPAA still
needs to permit care coordination associates to disclose information to other
parties involved in a given patient’s care coordination, regardless of whether
they are a covered entity, business associate, or fellow care coordination
associate. Allowing disclosures to all entities involved in a patient’s care
coordination allows the care team to dynamically adjust to changes in a patient’s
condition.
Moreover, HIPAA should continue to allow care coordination associate
disclosures related to population-based health activities. Population-based
health uses health data from individuals within a community to study general
trends and create treatment plans based on aggregate data, improving the
overall community health outcome. 265 Allowing care coordination associates to
share and disclose PHI for population-based health reasons would provide
additional patient data points. HIPAA currently allows sharing PHI for
population-based activities reasons through the healthcare operations prong of
TPO exceptions, 266 but an explicit mention in the HIPAA rules or an OCR
guidance would clarify this point.
The main argument against a care coordination associate solution is that
the HIPAA regulations already permit care coordination. As mentioned
previously, 267 care coordination appears to fall under the “treatment” or
“healthcare operations” prongs of HIPAA’s TPO permitted uses and
disclosures. Covered entities and business associates can share PHI for TPO
purposes without reaching out to the patient for permission or, if the target of
the shared PHI is not already a business associate, by drafting and executing a
business associate agreement before sharing PHI. This, however, is still subject
to a significant limitation—the minimum necessary principle. Unless the
disclosure is to a healthcare provider, the covered entity will need to limit the
PHI shared to just what will immediately treat the healthcare issue and nothing
more. The minimum necessary principle hinders a true care coordination
model, which requires a complete picture of patients to treat them holistically.
This can lead to worsened healthcare outcomes and disproportionally affects
patients who are indigent or suffer from chronic conditions.
265. See supra text accompanying note 138.
266. See supra text accompanying note 136–40.
267. See supra Section I.C.
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Additionally, the language for the TPO prongs are vague, mentioning care
coordination but not truly defining it. 268 As such, HIPAA-regulated entities
fear violating HIPAA due to the public complaint-driven enforcement system,
the high costs of violation, and patient confidence in health privacy. 269 Covered
entities are reluctant to disclose PHI unless they are completely sure that such
an action is expressly permitted by HIPAA. The recent OCR guidance on care
coordination did not successfully define which care coordination scenarios are
allowed, except for the health-plan-to-health-plan exception. As the HIPAA
regulations are currently written—with a strict minimum necessary principle
and vague TPO language—HIPAA-regulated entities are not willing to broadly
share PHI for care coordination purposes.
Another argument against the care coordination associate solution is the
additional cost to achieve compliance for resource-constrained organizations.
The care coordination associate designation would thrust additional
responsibilities on cash-strapped organizations to ensure patient privacy for care
coordination purposes; however, such responsibilities will likely be manageable.
For organizations that are already covered entities or business associates,
HIPAA requires a designated “security official” and “privacy official,” 270 in
addition to a contact person for OCR investigations. 271 The theoretical
responsibilities of a care coordination associate are not significantly different
from the existing responsibilities of compliance officers. As such, these
responsibilities are unlikely to be an undue burden on these organizations,
especially considering how they can improve the efficacy of a care coordination
model.
Third-party organizations involved in care coordination that are not
already regulated under HIPAA will feel the greatest burden with the
introduction of a care coordination associate designation. These newly covered
third parties will need to handle new responsibilities for patient privacy and
security measures. However, if the care coordination associate did not exist,
these third-party organizations would need to become a business associate to
receive, use, and disclose health data from a covered entity. This would force
them to follow all the administrative, technical, and physical safeguards
required of a business associate, and subject them to the minimum necessary
principle. In the existing HIPAA regulations, third-party organizations
involved in care coordination need to undergo a privacy and security overhaul
to become HIPAA compliant. With the care coordination associate delegation,
third-party organizations will have the burden of similar, but possibly reduced,

268.
269.
270.
271.

See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.C.
See supra text accompanying notes 221–22.
See supra text accompanying note 224.
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privacy and security requirements, but greater access to a patient’s holistic
health information which will allow for more effective care coordination.
B.

Expand Exceptions to the Minimum Necessary Principle

A separate approach to accomplish holistic care coordination is to expand
the exceptions for the minimum necessary principle. 272 Under the existing
framework, the minimum necessary principle applies to care coordinationrelated exchanges and limits sharing PHI to absolutely necessary information
for the treatment or support for the immediate issue. This, however, is
shortsighted since covered entities adhering to the minimum necessary
principle will only address the most recent clinical issue. The limited treatment
model caused by the minimum necessary principle is insufficient in allowing for
effective care coordination and populated-based health initiatives. It also fails
to consider assistance that nonmedical third-party entities can provide.
Instead, HHS should expand minimum necessary exceptions to
encompass care coordination and population-based activities. The current
regulation has only one health-care-related exception: for treatment reasons
between health providers. Explicit allowance for care coordination and
population-based activity purposes would encourage freely sharing PHI to
noncovered entities involved in care coordination. This also allows for a
comprehensive, person-centered approach where entities involved in care have
complete pictures of the healthcare services that an individual receives. For lowresource patients and patients with chronic health conditions, who are often
seen in various provider settings, a holistic approach can be critical to their care.
Furthermore, a holistic approach can better address health issues that affect the
broader community. Expanding the minimum necessary principle in the care
coordination context can ensure that HIPAA does not impede covered entities
in sharing the necessary PHI to promulgate the best possible healthcare
services.
Additionally, adding a care coordination exception is the best approach to
fix the minimum necessary principle since changing its definition 273 would have
broader implications beyond the care coordination and overall population
health context. Maintaining the existing definition while adding a care
coordination exception retains flexibility in the standard while also protecting
from unwarranted disclosures in other scenarios.
Modifying the minimum necessary principle could work as a solution on
its own, but HHS could also integrate this solution into the care coordination

272. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(2) (2019) (listing scenarios where the minimum necessary
principle does not apply); see also supra notes 73–78 and accompanying text.
273. § 164.502(b) (“[A] covered entity must make reasonable efforts to limit [PHI] to the
minimum necessary to accomplish the intended purpose of the use, disclosure, or request.”).
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associate approach discussed above. Because the care coordination associate
approach permits full use and disclosure to any entity involved in a patient’s
care coordination, expanding minimum necessary exceptions may be
extraneous. However, expanding minimum necessary exceptions would provide
additional clarity and emphasize that HIPAA allows for free sharing,
encouraging entities to rely on a comprehensive care coordination model.
Furthermore, because these noncovered entities would not be subject to
HIPAA as a covered entity or business associate, HHS would need to establish
some sort of security and privacy standards to ensure secure handling of PHI
as a collateral consequence of only modifying the minimum necessary principle.
This would require going beyond carving out exceptions to the minimum
necessary principle and require HHS to consider these additional factors in
crafting regulations. Previously noncovered entities would need to implement
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards—a costly endeavor for a
third-party organization. Thus, merely adding exceptions to the minimum
necessary principle creates collateral changes that are much more expansive than
originally envisioned.
Ultimately, the first approach would be a more sweeping change—and
probably more effective. But if it is not possible to adopt, then modifying the
minimum necessary principle is a quick and simple solution. However, in
modifying the minimum necessary principle, there will need to be additional
consideration paid to how the noncovered entity will receive and handle PHI
in a secure manner.
CONCLUSION
Without a clear definition for care coordination under HIPAA, covered
entities are limited to providing care coordination for TPO purposes only. In
order to work with third-party nonmedical social services, covered entities must
take on a costly work-around by implementing business associate agreements or
obtaining express authorization from patients. Yet these third parties can play
a critical role in the proper management of chronic diseases for the medically
indigent, even if their support services are not traditionally thought of as
treatment.
This convoluted path makes for poor care coordination. After all,
comprehensive care coordination requires an open communication network
where entities involved can freely communicate with each other regarding a
patient’s physical, psychological, social, and spiritual well-being so that they
may be able to adjust and adapt a patient’s care plan as necessary. Additionally,
these third parties need more flexibility to share data on population-based
health activities, which can ultimately improve a community’s overall health
outcomes.
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While the recent OCR guidance has clarified some areas related to care
coordination, specifically for health plans and marketing purposes, guidance
alone is insufficient to remove the barriers perceived by covered entities.
Instead, reform to HIPAA regulations is the only way to accomplish this and
ensure that care coordination can be maximized. Without HIPAA reform,
indigent patients with chronic conditions will continue to languish with a high
risk for serious health complications in the future.
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